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INTRODUCTION
This Comment examines the underlying tension between bankruptcy law and intellectual property law in the context of nonexclusive
patent licenses. The tension arises when a patent owner (i.e., a licen1
2
sor) grants a license for its patent and the licensee files for bank3
ruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code while
the license is still in effect. In a traditional Chapter 11 filing, the debtor-licensee assumes an asset (here, the patent license) by becoming a
4
debtor-in-possession and is then free to assign the asset to another
1

The terms “patent owner” and “licensor” are used interchangeably throughout
this Comment.
2
For the purposes of this Comment, the licensee will always be the debtor party
filing for bankruptcy.
3
Chapter 11 filings are typically used by businesses seeking reorganization. See 11
U.S.C. § 1101 (2006); WILLIAM D. WARREN & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 22 (8th
ed. 2009) (“Chapter 11 may be used by both individuals and firms, but is designed
primarily for business firms.”).
4
Section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor-in-possession has
the rights, powers, and fiduciary obligations of a standard Chapter 11 trustee. See 11
U.S.C. § 1107. For a definition of a Chapter 11 trustee, see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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entity in order to facilitate its restructuring and reorganization plan.
From the licensor’s perspective, however, the debtor-licensee is not
free to assign the license because it is nontransferable. Furthermore,
patent law’s fundamental “right to exclude” principle allows the patent owner to sue for patent infringement in the absence of a license
6
agreement. Thus, the question becomes whether a debtor-licensee
should be allowed to continue operating under its license once it files
for bankruptcy, or if a conflict in bankruptcy and patent law should
prevent the debtor-licensee from assuming and using the license. If the
debtor-licensee’s ability to use an essential asset is subject to conflicting
law, then neither the licensor nor the licensee can be sure of its rights.
With technology at the forefront of today’s economy, many companies increasingly rely on technology licenses in order to conduct
their businesses. Unsurprisingly, the right to continue using intellectual property licenses—in particular, patent licenses—is critical to the
survival of a distressed debtor. Most importantly, the debtor-licensee’s
assured ability to assume and assign the license will determine whether it will be able to successfully obtain financing or even continue operations after undergoing a Chapter 11 filing.
Part I of this Comment outlines the considerations of Chapter 11
bankruptcy law relating to patent licenses and a debtor-licensee’s interests. Part II identifies the competing interests of patent law. Part
III explores the various approaches courts have taken to address the
conflict between bankruptcy and patent law, focusing on the development of the two main tests that courts have adopted to resolve the
conflict. In addition, Part III examines the recent case law trends in
some bankruptcy courts. Part IV investigates the statutory interpretation and legislative history of section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code
and focuses on why the literal reading of the statute should prevail.
Part V discusses how the literal reading of section 365(c) enables patent rights to be a form of creditor protection against the competing
interests of a strong bankruptcy policy.

5

In bankruptcy law, assumption and assignment of patent licenses are governed
by 11 U.S.C. § 365 because patent licenses are considered “executory contracts.” See
infra Part I.
6
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK: TACTICS AND PRACTICE § 11-7, at 124 (3d ed. 1999).
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I. EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. Contracts as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate
Bankruptcy law relies on the concept of freely assignable rights of
property in order to facilitate the restructuring and reorganization of
7
the debtor. In particular, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code tries to
preserve the ongoing value of the business and maximize the econom8
ic return to all constituents of the business. At its heart, a business is
no more than a series of contracts enabling the development, production, or sale of a good or service. Putting aside a company’s physical
assets (e.g., land, buildings, equipment, inventory), the majority of a
company’s value comes from its contracts with its creditors, distributors, suppliers, customers, and the like.
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy es9
tate is created upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy
estate is considered to have a separate legal existence than that of the
10
debtor who filed the case. The Bankruptcy Code defines “property of
the estate” as all of the debtor’s legal and equitable interests in property
11
as of the bankruptcy petition’s filing date. Courts have interpreted a
12
debtor’s bankruptcy estate to include the debtor’s contractual rights.
In the case of a debtor business filing for Chapter 11, the bankruptcy estate includes the debtor’s physical assets as well as the debtor’s contracts
13
with any creditors, distributors, suppliers, customers, and the like.
7

See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (1981) (allowing for the
assignment of contractual rights except in specific cases such as illegality or undue
hardship); see also Shaw Group, Inc. v. Bechtel Jacobs Co. (In re IT Group), 350 B.R.
166, 177 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“The [Bankruptcy] Code generally favors free assignability as a means to maximize the value of the debtor’s estate and, to that end, allows
the [debtor] to assign notwithstanding a provision in the contract or lease, or applicable law, prohibiting, restricting, or conditioning assignment.” (second alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting L.R.S.C. Co. v. Rickel Home
Ctrs., Inc. (In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc.), 209 F.3d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 2000))).
8
See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (discussing the principles behind the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and
how “Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy
creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners”).
9
11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
10
Id.
11
See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203 (viewing section 541(a)(1) as “a definition of
what is included in the estate, rather than as a limitation”).
12
See, e.g., Quarles House Apartments v. Plunkett (In re Plunkett), 23 B.R. 392, 394
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982) (noting that courts have interpreted section 541 as “protect[ing] a debtor’s contractual right as an asset of the estate”).
13
11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
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B. Patent Licenses as Executory Contracts
The conflict between intellectual property and bankruptcy law
arises from the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of a special type of con14
tract, known as an “executory contract,” under section 365. Any contracts that require, at the time of the bankruptcy petition filing, fur15
In
ther performance from each party are considered executory.
particular, nonexclusive licenses, such as those commonly found in
patent licenses, are considered executory contracts within the mean16
ing of the Code. This is because both parties have continuing obligations—in the case of a nonexclusive patent license, the licensor has
a continuing obligation not to sue the licensee for infringement of its
patent, and the licensee has a continuing obligation to commercialize
17
the licensed invention.
With executory contracts, a debtor has three options: (1) rejection
of the contract, (2) assumption of the contractual obligations, or (3)
18
assignment (i.e., transfer) of the contract. The ability to freely choose
14

An executory contract is “a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either
to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance
of the other.” Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973); see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 872
F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989) (adopting Countryman’s definition of “executory contract”).
15
See Unsecured Creditor’s Comm. of Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co. v.
Southmark Corp. (In re Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co.), 139 F.3d 702, 705 (9th
Cir. 1998) (defining an “executory contract” as one where both parties continue to
have obligations under the contract such that failure to perform an obligation would
be a material breach that would justify the other’s nonperformance).
16
See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a nonexclusive patent license was an executory contract based on the “unperformed, continuing core obligations of notice and forbearance in licensing”).
17
See David R. Kuney, Restructuring Dilemmas for the High Technology Licensee: Will
“Plain Meaning” Bring Order to the Chaotic Bankruptcy Law for Assumption and Assignment of
Technology Licenses?, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 123, 135 (2008) (noting that in bankruptcy, patent licenses “are almost uniformly regarded as executory contracts”); Ann Livingston
& Leif M. Clark, Technology Transfers: What if the Other Party Files Bankruptcy?, 21 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 173, 180-81 (1989) (“In the context of technology transfers, most agreements will include continuing rights and duties by both parties and will be considered
executory.”); Robert L. Tamietti, Technology Licenses Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Licensee’s Mine Field, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 301 (1988) (“[A] [patent] license must be executory throughout its term. Each day the licensee uses the licensor’s technology, the
licensor forebears its right to sue the licensee for conduct that ‘but for the license,
would be an infringement.’” (quoting United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle,
m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981))); see also infra Part II.
18
See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(2) (declaring that a debtor’s plan may, subject to section
365, “provide for the assumption, rejection, or assignment of any executory contract”).
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and exercise these three options is fundamental to a debtor’s ability to
maximize the value of its assets during reorganization or restructuring.
1. Rejection of an Executory Contract
The first option, rejection, is relatively straightforward. The debtor simply rejects the contracts it deems to be of low value or highly
19
cumbersome to operate. Under section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy
20
Code, the debtor’s trustee, with the approval of the bankruptcy
21
court, may reject an executory contract. This rejection constitutes a
breach of the contract, effective immediately prior to the debtor’s
22
bankruptcy filing. In technology licensing cases, section 365(n) of
the Bankruptcy Code provides a remedy for breach of contract if the
debtor party is the licensor—in these cases, the nondebtor party may
23
treat the license as terminated. Similarly, if the debtor party is the
19

Section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the rejection of an executory
contract. In order to reject an executory contract, the debtor must file a motion with
the bankruptcy court. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (listing the
timing requirements for such a motion). The court will consider the debtor’s motion
for authority to reject an executory contract using the “business judgment rule,” which
focuses on whether rejection of the executory contract would benefit the general unsecured creditors of the debtor’s estate. See, e.g., Robertson v. Pierce (In re Chi-Feng
Huang), 23 B.R. 798, 800-01 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (“We believe rejection of the burdensome test in favor of the ‘business judgment’ rule is dictated by logic as much as
precedent. . . . The primary issue is whether rejection would benefit the general unsecured creditors.”). Under the business judgment rule, the court will give great deference to the debtor’s decision to reject the contract and will not interfere with the decision unless there is a showing of bad faith or abuse of discretion. See Group of
Institutional Investors v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 550-51
(1943) (holding that the Court will not upset business judgment “except on a clear
showing that the limits of discretion have been exceeded”).
20
The debtor-in-possession also has the ability to assume, reject, or assign an executory contract. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
21
11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
22
Id.; see also Agarwal v. Pomona Valley Med. Group, Inc. (In re Pomona Valley
Med. Group, Inc.), 476 F.3d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the debtor’s rejection of the executory contract “constituted a breach of that contract effective immediately before [the debtor] filed for bankruptcy”).
23
See In re EI Int’l, 123 B.R. 64, 66 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991) (“The option consists of
the licensee choosing either to terminate the agreement or to retain the rights to performance by the other party under the agreement.”). Notably, Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Code after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir.
1985). In Lubrizol, the court recognized the difficulties that a licensee would face if the
debtor-licensor rejected (and thus terminated) the patent license, noting that the possibility of rejection could have a “chilling effect” on intellectual property licensing by
companies that did not have the strongest financial position. Id. at 1048. Recognizing
the importance of intellectual property licenses, Congress passed the Intellectual
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licensee, rejection of the license allows the nondebtor party to treat the
24
license as terminated. Thus, regardless of whether the debtor is the
patent licensor or licensee, if the debtor chooses to reject the license,
25
the license will be deemed terminated.
2. Assumption of an Executory Contract
The situation becomes more complex if the debtor party wishes to
assume and assign the license as a patent licensee, due to bankruptcy’s
protections of a debtor’s interests and estate. In Chapter 11 filings,
the assumption and assignment of an executory contract fundamen26
tally affects the debtor’s ability to restructure. The debtor will want
to assume the contracts it deems to be valuable and, upon assumption,
27
retain the contracts as part of its reorganization. Since a patent license authorizes the debtor-licensee to operate under the terms of the
license, the debtor-licensee will likely assume the license in order to
continue its business operations during bankruptcy. For example, a
debtor may be in the business of manufacturing widgets and has licensed a patent enabling it to produce the widget. After filing for
bankruptcy, if the debtor wishes to be able to continue its business
operations and (hopefully) make a profit, it must assume the patent
license in order to continue manufacturing the widgets legally, or risk
being sued for patent infringement by the patent owner.

Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, which provides that licensees of “intellectual property” (as defined in the Code) have the option to retain certain rights under
the license even in the face of the debtor-licensor’s rejection. Pub. L. No. 100-506, sec.
1(b), § 365(n)(1), 102 Stat. 2538, 2538 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)).
For a discussion of section 365(n) and the impact of a license rejection by a debtorlicensor, see SHARON K. SANDEEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK FOR THE BUSINESS LAWYER 179-81 (2d ed. 2009).
24
11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
25
For a discussion of the choices a licensor and licensee have when a license is
rejected, see Livingston & Clark, supra note 17, at 191, 207.
26
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (restricting the ability to modify any “contract, lease, right
or obligation” due to its assumption or assignment).
27
See Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic
Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 737 (2007) (noting how the bankruptcy system
“seeks to maximize the value of the remaining assets and capacities of the troubled entity” by “afford[ing] trustees and debtors substantial leeway to rescind contracts and
reorder the affairs of the entity”); Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, ECommerce and Dot-com Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including Intellectual Property Greements [sic], and Related Issues Under Sections 365(c),
365(e) and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 314 (2000)
(“[T]he purpose of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code is to permit the trustee to retain or assign valuable contracts and to abandon burdensome contracts . . . .”).
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The specific requirements for assuming a contract are governed
by section 365(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The main conditions are
that the debtor must assure the court of its “ability to cure past de28
faults and meet future obligations.” These two conditions are intended to ensure that the nondebtor party, who is forced to continue
29
performance, receives the full benefit of its bargain. In the case of a
patent license, because the licensor is foregoing its right to sue the licensee for conduct that “but for the license, would be an infringe30
ment,” the licensor must be assured that the debtor-licensee is in a
31
position to fulfill the commercialization terms of the patent license.
When a debtor assumes a contract, the debtor’s estate becomes ob32
ligated to take on the contract in its entirety. The debtor cannot pick
33
and choose parts of the contract it wishes to assume. Furthermore,
upon assumption of the contract, the nondebtor party is given priorityclaimant status for both previous and future amounts due under the

28

Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 27, at 311; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (identifying the requirements that must be satisfied at the time of assumption).
29
See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5845
(“If the trustee is to assume a contract . . . , the court will have to insure that the trustee’s performance under the contract . . . gives the other contracting party the full
benefit of his bargain.”)
30
United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); see also Tamietti, supra note 17, at 301 (quoting Studiengesellschaft Kohle in
explaining how a patent license constitutes an executory contract).
31
See Clinton H. Neagley, Patent Licensing for Small Agricultural Biotechnology Companies (discussing commercialization milestones in negotiating patent licenses), in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION
1213, 1213-19 (Krattiger et al. eds., 2007). If the licensed invention is not practiced
(i.e., through commercialization), the invention would be considered wasted. See
Note, Rights of the Owner of an Idle Patent in Equity, 20 HARV. L. REV. 638, 638-39 (1907).
32
See Tex. N. W. Ry. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (In re Chi. Rock
Island & Pac. R.R. Co.), 860 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that a “trustee cannot accept the benefits of an executory contract without accepting the burdens as well”
(quoting Schokbeton Indus., Inc. v. Schokbeton Prods. Corp., 466 F.2d 171, 175 (5th
Cir. 1972))); Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1311 (5th
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he often-repeated statement that the debtor must accept the contract
as a whole means only that the debtor cannot choose to accept the benefits of the contract and reject its burdens to the detriment of the other party of the agreement.”);
Rockland Ctr. Assocs. v. TSW Stores of Nanuet, Inc. (In re TSW Stores of Nanuet, Inc.),
34 B.R. 299, 304 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that executory contracts cannot be
accepted or rejected in part).
33
See In re Storage Tech. Corp., 53 B.R. 471, 475-76 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985)
(“[T]he Bankruptcy Code requires assumption of an entire agreement. Additionally, a
debtor cannot avoid the effect of this rule by construing various parts of a transaction
as separate agreements when they are clearly interdependent.” (citation omitted)).
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34

contract. Thus, the debtor’s assumption of an executory contract ele35
vates the noncreditor party over the debtor’s other creditors.
3. Assignment of an Executory Contract
If the debtor assumes the contract but chooses not to retain it,
36
then the debtor can elect to assign (i.e., transfer or sell) the contract.
Once the debtor has assumed the contract, it has the power to assign
37
the contract to third parties. A debtor might assign the contract in
order to raise capital through financing or cash to pay its creditors.
For example, in In re Haven Eldercare, the debtor, an operator of several
nursing, assisted living, and residential care facilities, petitioned for authority to sell some of its facilities as part of its Chapter 11 reorganiza38
tion plan. As part of this sale, the debtor sought to assume and assign
executory contracts and unexpired leases that were vital to the opera39
tion of these facilities. The bankruptcy court held that assumption
and assignment of the executory contracts and unexpired leases were
vital to the operation of the nursing facilities being sold and thus
40
integral to the debtor’s restructuring proposal. As In re Haven Eldercare
demonstrates, the assignment of the executory contract can play an essential role in the debtor’s restructuring or reorganization. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes the importance of this power and provides that
the debtor’s right to assign an executory contract overrides most non41
bankruptcy law and contractual restrictions on assignment.
34

See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2006).
In a bankruptcy proceeding, creditors are repaid based upon the priority of
their claims. Thus, the nondebtor party’s elevation in priority status is a significant byproduct of the debtor’s assumption of the executory contract. See Michael T. Andrew,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection,” 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 890
(1988) (stating that when a debtor assumes a contract, “the non-debtor party departs
the ranks of ordinary creditors and becomes a priority claimant both for past-due and
later-accruing amounts”).
36
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code states that “[t]he trustee, after notice and
hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property
of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Normally, when a nondebtor has an interest in the
same property, section 363(e) permits the trustee to sell, lease, or use the property after notice and hearing, provided that the nondebtor’s interest is adequately protected.
Id. § 363(e); see also id. § 361 (defining what constitutes “adequate protection” of an
interest).
37
Seeid. § 365(c), (f).
38
390 B.R. 762, 765 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008).
39
Id. at 765-69.
40
Id. at 772.
41
This “free assignability” principle is set forth in section 365(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which states, “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, not35
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To assist the debtor entity in maximizing its value under reorganization or restructuring, many courts have interpreted the Code to allow
42
the trustee or debtor-in-possession to assign most contracts regardless
43
of contrary nonbankruptcy law or contractual provisions. For example, in In re U.L. Radio Corp., the debtor was in the business of selling
and servicing televisions and had entered into a lease with its landlord
44
to rent a storefront for its operations. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, it tried to assume and assign (i.e., sell) its lease to a third party
45
to operate the space as a small bistro. The bankruptcy court held that
the lease could be assumed and assigned to the third party despite the
46
“deviation in use . . . from an appliance store to a small bistro.”
In the context of patent licensing, because the bankruptcy estate is
considered a separate legal entity than that of the debtor, an assumption of the license is also an assignment of the license, regardless of
whether the debtor-licensee actually assigns the license to a third par47
ty. When the debtor’s estate assumes the license, the estate also receives an assignment of the license. This automatic assignment creates an
issue for the patent licensor because the licensee is no longer the same
withstanding a provision in an executory contract . . . of the debtor, or in applicable
law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract . . . , the
trustee may assign such contract . . . under paragraph (2) of this subsection.” 11
U.S.C. § 365(f).
42
A trustee is an impartial person assigned by the court to oversee and administer
the debtor’s bankruptcy process. See id. §§ 701, 704 (describing the role of a trustee in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings). Most Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, however, do not
require appointment of a trustee. Instead, the business becomes a debtor-inpossession and continues to manage itself without an appointed trustee. See id. § 1107
(describing the rights and powers of a debtor-in-possession). In this Comment, I will
use the terms “trustee” and “debtor-in-possession” interchangeably, unless otherwise
explicitly noted.
43
Assignments are governed by section 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. See id.
§ 365(f). Subsection (f)(1) “partially invalidates restrictions on assignment of contracts or leases by the trustee to a third party.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5845. Subsection (f)(3) “invalidates contractual provisions
that permit termination or modification in the event of an assignment, as contrary to
the policy of this subsection.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5845; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (codifying that despite a restriction on transfer or an
ipso facto clause, “an interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the [debtor’s] estate”).
44
19 B.R. 537, 539 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 544-45.
47
This view is applied in what is known as the “hypothetical test.” See infra subsection III.B.1.

YING_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/17/2010 10:18 AM

The Plain Meaning of Section 365(c)

1235

48

legal entity as it was prebankruptcy. To better understand this issue,
we must first examine the basic principles of patent law.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW
A. The Balance Between Exclusivity and Disclosure
Though the power of free assignability is paramount to bankruptcy
law, it runs directly counter to the policies of exclusive use and monopolistic control in patent law. The Founding Fathers recognized the
importance of strong patent rights by granting Congress the power “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective
49
Writings and Discoveries.” From this language, Congress developed
exclusive-use policies in order to provide inventors and innovators with
50
incentives to create. By rewarding inventors and innovators with a period of exclusive use in exchange for disclosure of their creation, Con51
gress furthered the societal advancement of knowledge.

48

The Supreme Court has suggested that a debtor and its successor debtor-inpossession should be treated as the same entity for purposes of applying the Bankruptcy Code. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (“[I]t is sensible to
view the debtor-in-possession as the same ‘entity’ which existed before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its
contracts and property in a manner it could not have employed absent the bankruptcy
filing.”). Some courts, however, have read the Supreme Court’s comment as being “necessary only for the purposes of that case,” and have held that it “does not support in all
cases the proposition that no assignment or transfer occurs as a matter of law between
prepetition debtor and debtor in possession.” Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp.
(In re Mirant), 440 F.3d 238, 254 n.21 (5th Cir. 2006). Unfortunately, “neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has resolved the argument . . . that rights obtained in
bankruptcy require that a debtor in possession be treated as a distinct legal entity from a
prepetition debtor.” Id.; see also infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
49
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
50
The Patent Clause has been implemented through a series of acts that set out
the conditions for obtaining a patent; these are now codified in Title 35 of the U.S.
Code. See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792; Patent Act of 1922, ch. 58, 42 Stat.
389; Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318; Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. In particular, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006) describes a
patentee’s exclusive rights to her invention.
51
The word “patent” originates from the Latin patere, which means “to lay open”
(for public inspection), and the term “letters patent,” which originally denoted royal
decrees granting exclusive rights to certain individuals or businesses. See Application
of Bo Thuresson Af Ekenstam, 256 F.2d 321, 323 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (discussing the origin of the word “patent”).
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The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
52
1984, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, is a recent
example of Congress’s attempts to balance the limited period of exclusivity with invention disclosure. The Hatch-Waxman Act was designed to promote generic drug manufacturing while preserving a financial incentive for the research and development conducted by
pioneering drug companies (often brand-name pharmaceutical com53
panies). The Act allows generic drug companies to obtain marketing
approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) by submitting bio-equivalence studies of the drug compositions described in
54
The Act also
the pioneering drug company’s patent application.
grants the pioneering drug company a period of additional marketing
exclusivity of up to five years to compensate for the time the drug re55
mains under review for regulatory approval. Thus, in exchange for
disclosing the drug, the pioneering drug company is rewarded with a
56
period of market exclusivity.
A patent grants its owner the right to exclude others from practic57
ing its teachings (i.e., the invention). Through this exclusivity, patents create incentives for companies to engage in research and de58
Without the protection of patent rights, companies
velopment.
would not be willing to invest in research and development if third
59
parties could simply copy their research and steal their profits. In
52

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
See 130 CONG. REC. 23,764-65 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
54
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, tit. I, 98
Stat. at 1585-97 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)) (discussing abbreviated new drug applications).
55
See id. at tit. II, 98 Stat. at 1598-1603 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 35 U.S.C.).
56
See id.
57
See, e.g., Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1911)
(“A patent is not the grant of a right to make or use or sell. It does not, directly or indirectly, imply any such right. It grants only the right to exclude others.”).
58
See Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from NineteenthCentury World’s Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214, 1214-15 (2005) (arguing that innovation
must respond to profit incentives in order for patent laws to influence innovation and
referencing empirical studies that establish innovation’s responsiveness to incentives);
Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and R&D Incentives: Comments on the
Hubbard and Love Trade Framework for Financing Pharmaceutical R&D 2 (June 25,
2004), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/Submission3.pdf (questioning the ability of alternatives to patent protection to provide sufficient coverage of research and development costs and thus the incentive to innovate).
59
See, e.g., Howard T. Markey, Special Problems in Patent Cases, 66 F.R.D. 529, 532
(1975) (noting that patents provide both “the incentive to risk the investment of the
large sums and long years of effort required to bring the invention into the market53
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addition to large-scale funding, patent rights also enable small inven60
tors, in exchange for interests in the patent, to raise capital in order
61
to bring inventions to market.
B. Two Types of Patent Interests: Assignments and Licenses
62

An interest in a patent can be in the form of an assignment or a
63
license. The distinction between a patent assignment and license is
64
not merely one of word choice but of legal effect. A patent assign65
ment is a transfer of an ownership interest in the patent. As the Supreme Court stated in Waterman v. Mackenzie, there are three types of
patent assignments:
The patentee . . . may . . . assign, grant and convey, either, 1st, the whole
patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention throughout the United States; or, 2d, an undivided part or share of

place at a reasonable price” and “the only deterrent to secrecy and the only marketplace for ideas we have”).
60
Although most small or solo inventors qualify for “small-entity” status, and therefore are entitled to pay reduced patent fees, other types of nonprofit organizations also
fall under this umbrella, including universities. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2006) (reducing fees by fifty percent for small businesses, independent inventors, and nonprofits); 13
C.F.R. § 121.802(a) (2009) (providing that organizations with fewer than five hundred
employees qualify for reduced patent fees). Note that small-entity status is lost when the
patent is licensed, exclusively or nonexclusively, or assigned to an organization that
would not qualify for small-entity status. 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(2)(i) (2009).
61
See RICHARD STIM, PROFIT FROM YOUR IDEA: HOW TO MAKE SMART LICENSING
DECISIONS 4/10-4/12 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing “angel investors” who acquire equity
in businesses rather than giving loans).
62
As a matter of legal terminology, the term “assignment” has special meaning
within both patent and bankruptcy law. For purposes of this Comment, an “assignment” is a bankruptcy assignment under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, and not
a patent assignment of ownership of property. See infra note 66 for an explanation of
patent assignments.
63
One can also take an interest in a patent in the form of a lien. This occurs
when the lienholder takes a security interest in the patent. See U.C.C. § 9-102(42)
(2005) (defining “general intangibles” to include intellectual property by including
personal property and software in the definition); see also Scott J. Lebson, Security Interests in Intellectual Property in the United States, at pt. VIII (2006), http://www.
ladas.com/IPProperty/ipprop_securityinterests.html (discussing how, historically, liens
on patents have been perfected via U.S. Patent and Trademark Office filings).
64
See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891) (“Whether a transfer of a
particular right or interest under a patent is an assignment or a license does not depend
upon the name by which it calls itself, but upon the legal effect of its provisions.”).
65
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (defining patent ownership and assignment).
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that exclusive right; or, 3d, the exclusive right under the patent within
66
and throughout a specified part of the United States.

The Court noted, however, that “[a]ny assignment or transfer,
short of one of these, is a mere license, giving the licensee no title in
the patent, and no right to sue at law in his own name for an in67
fringement.” Thus, when a patent owner licenses its patent to a licensee, the patent owner is effectively granting the licensee a promise
68
not to sue for patent infringement. The licensee has not gained
69
“ownership” of the patent in any traditional sense of property, be70
cause a license does not equal an assignment. Simply put, a license is
merely a covenant not to sue for infringement and not the transfer or
71
conveyance of any property interest. Thus, the patent owner’s ability
to choose and control which parties license its technology is tanta72
mount to exercising its right to exclude. Without a valid license, the

66

138 U.S. at 255. The term “assignment” has a particular meaning in patent law,
implying formal transfer of title. For example, if Inventor A assigns full rights of the
patent to Company X, then Company X is the owner of the patent and has full rights,
including the rights to enforce and license the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 261; Vaupel
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that in patent law, an assignment constitutes “a formal transfer of title”).
67
Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255.
68
See Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[A] patent
license agreement is in essence nothing more than a promise by the licensor not to sue
the licensee . . . [e]ven if [the promise is] couched in terms of ‘[l]icensee is given the
right to make, use, or sell X . . . .’” (italics added) (citation omitted) (fourth alteration in
original)); W. Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1930) (“In
its simplest form, a license means only leave to do a thing which the licensor would otherwise have a right to prevent. Such a license grants to the licensee merely a privilege
that protects him from a claim of infringement by the owner of the patent monopoly.”).
69
Patents are treated as personal property. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the
provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”).
70
See Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255 (noting the differences between a patent assignment and a patent license); Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89
F.3d 673, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that nonexclusive patent licenses are
considered to be personal rights that do not include any rights to assign or to sublicense unless expressly given by the licensor).
71
See Tamietti, supra note 17, at 301 (“A license simply insulates those who pay for
use of proprietary technology from the costs of infringement litigation, and does not
transfer rights of ownership in the subject technology.” (footnote omitted)).
72
See, e.g., Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F.
288, 290-92 (6th Cir. 1896) (discussing the extent of a patent licensee’s interests and
limitations).
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practicing party has no authority to practice the patented invention
73
and, therefore, is committing patent infringement.
C. Exclusive Versus Nonexclusive Patent Licenses
A patent owner can choose to grant the licensee an exclusive or
nonexclusive license. In an exclusive license, the patent holder promises that it will neither exploit the patent itself, nor permit any use of
74
the patent other than by the licensee. A single patent can have multiple “exclusive licensees,” such that each licensee is granted exclusive
rights to a portion of the overall patent rights. Such exclusive rights
are often divided temporally, geographically, by field of use, by type of
75
use, or on a claim-by-claim basis. As a general rule, if an exclusive licensee wishes to bring forth an infringement suit, the patent holder
76
must be joined, either voluntarily or involuntarily. The courts, however, have regarded this rule “as being prudential rather than consti77
tutional in nature,” and thus subject to an exception in the case
78
when “all substantial rights” in the patent are transferred. Accordingly, when all substantial rights in the patent have been transferred
to the licensee, the licensee has effectively become an assignee of the
79
patent, and therefore has legal title to the patent.

73

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).
74
See, e.g., MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 18.02[B]
(5th ed. Supp. 2009) (discussing limitations that may be placed on grants of intellectual property licenses).
75
See Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1276-79 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (describing various types of exclusive patent licenses).
76
See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“A licensee may obtain sufficient rights in the patent to be entitled to seek relief from
infringement, but to do so, it ordinarily must join the patent owner.”).
77
Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
78
Int’l Gamco, 504 F.3d at 1277-78.
79
See Enzo APA & Son, Inc., v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“[I]n certain limited circumstances, where all substantial rights under the patent have
been transferred in the form of an exclusive license, . . . the licensee [is] the virtual
assignee.”). Courts have held that “an assignee is the patentee and has standing to
bring suit for infringement in its own name.” Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (2006)
(defining the term “patentee” as including “not only the patentee to whom the patent
was issued but also the successors in title to the patentee”); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (providing
that a “patentee” has a “remedy by civil action” for patent infringement); Arachnid,
Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (interpreting §§ 281
and 100(d) to require that a party holding legal title to the patent bring an infringement suit to vindicate its rights).
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On the other hand, a nonexclusive license is characterized by the
patent holder promising only that it will not sue the licensee for infringement, with no other promises regarding how it will exercise its
80
monopoly power. The nonexclusive licensee “has no property inter81
est in the monopoly of the patent.” Furthermore, unlike an exclusive licensee, the nonexclusive licensee does not have a contract with
82
the patent owner that forbids others from practicing the invention.
“[T]he patent owner may freely license others, or may tolerate in83
fringers,” without violating any rights of the nonexclusive licensee.
Thus, a nonexclusive patent licensee only has the right to practice the
patented invention and does not have the right to sue others for in84
fringing the patent.
D. Patent Law’s Strong Protection of Owners’ Rights
As the economic climate shifts from an industrial-based economy
to a knowledge-based economy, strong protection of patent rights is
85
used to ensure that knowledge is not exploited. For example, on the
international level, in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United States entered into an international agreement known as the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to establish standards for
86
global patent regulation. Additionally, as discussed previously, the
80

HAROLD EINHORN & THOMAS J. PARKER, 1 PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS
§ 1.01[2][c] (2007).
81
W. Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1930); see
also id. at 118-19 (discussing the lack of a contract preventing others from practicing
the invention).
82
See id. at 118-19.
83
Id. at 118.
84
See id. (“[A] bare license to practice a patented invention gives the licensee no
right to join as plaintiff in a suit against an infringer.”).
85
For a discussion of the United States’ shift from an industrial-based economy to
a knowledge-based economy and the use of intellectual property as a global currency,
see Colleen Spring Zimmerman, Overview: Intellectual Property—the New Global Currency,
in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 0.1-0.40 (Melvin Simensky
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999).
86
See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 56-57,
61-65 (2000) (tracing the evolution of international protections for intellectual property and examining how the United States made maximizing intellectual property privileges the number-one priority of trade policy); William Hennessey, Patent Protection
and Its Role in Promoting Invention, Innovation, and Technological Development 3-4,
7-8 ( June 1, 1999), http://www.piercelaw.edu/assets/pdf/hennessey-patentprotectionand-its-role-in-promoting.pdf (discussing the benefits of stronger patent-protection
rights arising out of TRIPS).
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Constitution provides that inventors and creators be rewarded with
87
exclusive rights to their creations and discoveries.
In exchange for disclosing the invention, the patent owner is giv88
en the exclusive right to the invention. As part of this right, the patent owner has the choice of granting, to whomever it desires, a full
assignment, an exclusive license, or a nonexclusive license for the pa89
tented invention. The type of license granted determines the licen90
see’s rights and scope of use of the patented invention.
In order to exercise her right to the fullest extent, the patent own91
er must have control over the identity of the patent licensee. This,
however, becomes an issue when a Chapter 11 debtor-licensee wishes
to assume the patent license during bankruptcy proceedings through
the bankruptcy estate, which is considered a separate legal entity from
92
the debtor. In bankruptcy, when the debtor’s estate assumes the license, the debtor-licensee effectively assigns the license to the estate.
This automatic assignment, though beneficial to the debtor-licensee, is
problematic for the patent licensor because the patent license is no
93
longer held by the same legal entity as it was prebankruptcy. Furthermore, even assuming that the patent license was still held by the
same prepetition “entity,” the same right-to-control problems would
arise once the debtor-licensee tried to sell the license to a third party as
part of its restructuring or reorganization plan under Chapter 11.
87

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
89
See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (distinguishing between
patent assignments and licenses).
90
See, e.g., Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 262 F. Supp. 2d
358, 364-65 (D. Del. 2003) (holding that the language of the license agreement, which
defined the scope of the license, could not be ignored).
91
See Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 780-81 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining the
“strong policy reasons [for placing] the burden on the licensee to get the licensor’s
explicit consent” before transferring a license to a third party); Rhone-Poulenc Agro,
S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 271 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that
“[a]llowing free assignability of patent licenses” would result in the patent holder losing “the very important ability to control the identity of the licensees”), vacated on other
grounds en banc, 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re
CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (relying on the policy concern that
the patent holder have the ability to control the identity of licensees and holding that
nonexclusive patent licenses are not assignable); cf. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734
F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting in the context of a copyright claim that the
requirement that the licensee obtain explicit permission ensures that the licensor will
be able to monitor the use of the property right).
92
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
93
See also discussion supra note 48 (noting that the question of whether a legal
transfer occurs between a debtor and its debtor-in-possession is still open).
88
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III. THE LEGAL SYSTEM’S APPROACH TO THE TENSION BETWEEN
BANKRUPTCY AND PATENT LAW
A. Transferability of Patent Licenses and the Federal Common Law Principle
As every law student has learned in Civil Procedure, the general
rule, as stated in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, is that “[t]here is no
94
The courts have allowed federal
federal general common law.”
common law, however, where a federal rule of decision is “necessary
95
to protect uniquely federal interests.” In such cases, the creation of a
federal rule should be “limited to situations where there is a ‘significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
96
state law.’” In the special case of patents and patent licensing, the
courts have developed a federal common law principle to govern the
97
transferability of patent-license rights. The default rule is that, unless
the patent license expressly authorizes the transfer of the license, a
98
patent licensee’s rights are personal and nontransferable.
94

304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 426 (1964)).
96
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
97
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989)
(acknowledging that, to the extent state intellectual property regulation conflicts with
federal regulation, it is preempted because national uniformity in the balance struck
by patent protection is of the utmost importance); Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb
Genetics Corp., 271 F.3d 1081, 1088-89 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining the development
and rationale of the federal common law principle governing patent licensing), vacated
on other grounds en banc, 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Note, however, that scholars
have debated whether a federal common law really exists. See, e.g., Marie T. Reilly, The
Federal Interest in the Transfer of Patent License Rights in Bankruptcy, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
3, 15-23 (2001) (arguing that the “personal” nature of patent licensing amounts to a
state law contract issue and, therefore, cannot amount to a federal common law with
respect to patent-license transferability).
98
See Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 787 F.2d 655, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“It is well
settled that a non-exclusive licensee of a patent has only a personal and not a property
interest in the patent and that this personal right cannot be assigned unless the patent
owner authorizes the assignment or the license itself permits assignment.”). Other
forms of intellectual property, such as copyright, also follow the same default rule.
Under copyright law, “a non-exclusive licensee . . . has only a personal and not a property interest in the [intellectual property],” which “cannot be assigned unless the [intellectual property] owner authorizes the assignment.” In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc.,
210 B.R. 237, 242-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gilson, 787 F.2d at 658); see also 3 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 10.02[A] (2009) (noting that the grant of a nonexclusive license is not a
transfer of ownership).
95
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The federal common law principle of patent nonassignability “has
been the rule at least since 1852 when the Supreme Court decided
99
Troy Iron & Nail v. Corning.” Even after the Supreme Court stated in
Erie that there is no general federal common law, federal courts have
100
continued to apply the default rule of patent nonassignability.
As
explained by the Seventh Circuit in Unarco Industries, Inc. v. Kelley Co.,
application of the rule is justified because patent law policy “is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they
affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in
101
those statutes, rather than by local law.” In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s express acknowledgment that patents are a matter of federal
102
policy justifies the application of federal law.
Many lower federal courts have agreed with the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits’ rationales, recognizing that the federal common law
prohibits a bankruptcy assignment of a patent license without the con103
sent of the licensor. Further, these courts have recognized that the
federal common law preempts any state law or bankruptcy policy that
would permit a bankruptcy assignment despite the licensor’s opposi104
tion. Thus, these courts consider the federal common law of nonassignability to be within the scope of “applicable law” under section
105
Accordingly, the free trans365(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.

99

PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1979).
See, e.g., Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 67980 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “[b]ecause federal law governs the assignability of
nonexclusive patent licenses, and because federal law makes such licenses personal
and assignable only with the consent of the licensor, [a] license is not assumable and
assignable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)”).
101
465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
102
See In re CFLC, 89 F.3d at 679 (noting that permitting states to provide for free
assignability of nonexclusive patent licenses “would undermine the reward that encourages invention because a party seeking to use the patented invention could either
seek a license from the patent holder or seek an assignment of an existing patent license from a licensee” (emphasis omitted)).
103
See, e.g., Murray v. Franke-Misal Techs. Group, LLC (In re Supernatural Foods,
LLC), 268 B.R. 759, 802 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (“The rule, simply stated, is that while
ownership of patent rights is assignable, the rights granted under a non-exclusive license cannot inure to a third party, unless the licensor consents to such assignment.”).
104
Id.
105
See, e.g., In re CFLC, 89 F.3d at 680 (concluding that because the federal common
law principle of nonassignability governs nonexclusive licenses, it is applicable under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Supernatural Foods, 268 B.R. at 796 (asserting that
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enforces the common law of nonassignability).
100
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ferability principle codified in section 365(f) is subject to the limita106
tions of the federal common law of nonassignability.
Some state courts, however, have rejected the application of such
107
a common law principle. Most notably, in Farmland Irrigation Co. v.
Dopplmaier, Justice Traynor rejected the notion of a federal common
law and held that state law should govern the assignment of patent li108
Justice Traynor identified three bases for the decision:
censes.
(1) because the nonassignability doctrine was decided before Erie, it
did not address the issue of whether state or federal law should apply;
(2) the fact patterns in earlier cases had license agreements based on
the personal skills of the licensee; and (3) the federal common law
109
rule undermined important state rules that favored free assignability.
Many commentators have adopted Justice Traynor’s reasoning,
noting that neither the Seventh nor the Ninth Circuit ever truly addressed whether there was an underlying conflict between state and
federal policy, or whether such a conflict would justify undermining
110
state law.
Others argue that under a proper economic approach,
state law should prevail because it allows “the parties to maximize the
111
In addition,
value of the licenses to themselves and to society.”
some commentators take the view that “federal courts appear to have
overreached themselves in continuing to invent federal common law
112
to forbid the assignment of a license agreement.”

106

See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2006) (proscribing assignment when “applicable law”
prevents parties other than the debtor from accepting or rendering performance on a
contract); id. § 365(f) (allowing a trustee to assign a debtor’s contracts except as provided in subsection (c)).
107
See, e.g., Superbrace, Inc. v. Tidwell, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404, 414 (Ct. App. 2004)
(“[W]e choose to stand steadfastly by our Supreme Court’s 1957 ruling in Dopplmaier
that state law, not federal common law, is to be applied when determining whether a
patent license is assignable.”).
108
308 P.2d 732, 739 (Cal. 1957) (stating that there is “no policy underlying the
federal patent statutes that requires a uniform federal rule of construction of license
contracts to determine their assignability”).
109
Id. at 738-40.
110
See, e.g., Carole A. Quinn & R. Scott Weide, Violation of the Erie Doctrine: Application of a Rule of Federal Common Law to Issues of Patent License Transferability, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1121, 1143-45 (1999) (providing hypothetical situations to which application of federal law is unjustified).
111
Daniel A. Wilson, Patent License Assignment: Preemption, Gap Filling, and Default
Rules, 77 B.U. L. REV. 895, 911 (1997).
112
Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Control Without Interest: State Law of Assignment, Federal
Preemption, and the Intellectual Property License, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, ¶ 81 (2001),
http://vjolt.net/vol6/issue1/v6i1a08-Fellmeth.html.
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B. Inconsistent Case Law
Despite the debate, one central factor emerges from these competing approaches: the patent holder’s consent to transferability.
From a bankruptcy perspective, those opposed to the federal common
law approach view nonexclusive patent licenses as undermining the
113
fundamental principle of maximizing a debtor’s estate.
Under this
view, requiring a licensor’s explicit consent impedes the free transferability of the license, thereby undermining the heart of bankruptcy
114
restructuring. From a patent perspective, however, a licensor’s control over its competitors is fundamental to a patent owner’s right to
115
exclude. Thus, in order to prevent injury to the nondebtor party, a
patent owner’s express authorization should be required before a
116
debtor-licensee may assume and assign its patent license.
The question then becomes whether a nonexclusive licensee can
continue to operate under its license once it files for bankruptcy. Put
another way, does the combination of bankruptcy and patent law result in a prohibition against assumption and assignment of patent li117
censes such that the debtor can no longer use the license? Because
a nonexclusive patent license does not constitute a sale of the patent
and no ownership rights are transferred, the debtor-licensee cannot
sell its license agreement in order to pay its creditors in a bankruptcy
118
Ultimately, reconciling the conflict between patent
proceeding.
113

See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 111, at 910-11 (arguing against federal patent policy
preemption of state laws permitting assignment because such preemption prevents the
maximization of license values).
114
See id. (asserting that license assignment “allow[s] the parties to maximize the
value of the licenses to themselves and to society”).
115
See Concrete Washout Sys., Inc. v. Washout Sys., LLC, No. 08-2214, 2008 WL
5411965, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2008) (“One of the fundamental and valuable aspects of a patent is the right to exclude others from using one’s invention. In light of
Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, its inability to control the use of its invention will constitute irreparable injury.” (citation omitted)).
116
See supra Sections II.B-D.
117
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (2006) (prohibiting a trustee from assuming or assigning debtor contracts when applicable law excuses a party to the contract, other
than the debtor, from accepting or rendering performance); id. § 365(f) (allowing
assignments except when prohibited by subsection (c)).
118
See In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 44 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999)
(“Unless the [license] conveys some or all of the right to exclude others from practicing the invention, it will not convey an interest in the patent, but is a mere license.”).
An exclusive license will convey an interest in the patent, but a nonexclusive license is
still a mere license and is treated as an executory contract subject to the rules of assumption and assignment. See id. at 44-45 (holding that the license at issue was nonexclusive and was therefore an executory contract).
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rights and bankruptcy principles requires determining whether the
licensor must provide express consent to the transferability of the license in order for the debtor, as debtor-in-possession, to assume and
119
assign the license to support its reorganization.
The case law, however, has not provided a clear answer. In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., decided in 1987, was the earliest bankruptcy court
decision to hold that the federal common law principle of nonassig120
nability forecloses the transfer of a patent license.
In Alltech, the
debtor had acquired a nonexclusive license to manufacture plastic
121
containers using a patented process.
Upon filing for bankruptcy,
the debtor sought to sell its interest to a third party, but the patent
holder contended that under the federal common law such an as122
The patent
signment was prohibited without its express consent.
holder further asserted that the contract was nondelegable and that,
therefore, section 365(c) of the Code applied and precluded the deb123
tor from assumption or assignment. By contrast, the intended third
party transferee took the position that the court should apply the free
transferability principle of section 365(f), which meant any antias124
The court
signment clause in “applicable law” was unenforceable.
ultimately held that, despite the provisions of section 365(f), the fed125
eral common law principle of patent nonassignability governed.
The court concluded that,
although [a patent license’s] nonassignment is not statutorily mandated,
the century old common law classification of patent licenses appears to
place them within the realm of the types of contracts traditionally associated with section 365(c). As such . . . the Trustee in this instance does
not have the power to assign the patent license absent consent from the
126
licensor.

119

See Kuney, supra note 17, at 142 (defining this as the “critical issue” that emerges
once a license is found to be an executory contract for purposes of section 365).
120
71 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987) (“[N]otwithstanding subsection
365(f), both [federal common] law and equity pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) ‘excuse’
the nondebtor party from accepting assignment . . . .”). Although the debtor in Alltech
filed for Chapter 7, the court’s rationale is relevant and applicable to both Chapter 7
and 11 cases.
121
Id. at 687.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 687-88.
125
See id. at 689 (noting that “[t]he rights of the patent owner to license the use of
his invention is a creature of federal common law as is the right of the licensee to have
the license construed”).
126
Id.
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After Alltech, this question of federal common law applicability in
bankruptcy proceedings did not reach the circuit court level for approximately ten years.
Finally in 1996, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in Everex Sys127
tems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.). In In re CFLC, the debtor
was in the business of manufacturing personal computers and had a
128
nonexclusive license to use Cadtrak’s computer-graphics technology.
When the debtor sought to sell substantially all of its assets, Cadtrak objected to the sale on the basis that the patent license was not assignable
129
The Ninth Circuit, while recognizing
under federal common law.
130
that “[t]here is no federal general common law,” was concerned that
the “free assignability” notion of state law would undermine the monopoly rights fundamental to federal patent policy and hinder the crit131
ically important economic incentive that encourages innovation.
The court ultimately held that the federal common law principle of
nonassignability applied, and the debtor was barred from assigning the
132
license without Cadtrak’s consent.
Since Alltech and In re CFLC, two competing judicial approaches
have developed at the circuit court level: the “hypothetical” test and
the “actual” test. The hypothetical test, which requires the licensor’s
explicit consent for assignment, has been adopted by four circuits—
the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh—and is frequently applied in
133
cases involving technology companies.
Most bankruptcy courts,
134
however, do not follow the hypothetical test.
Instead, they, along
127

89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 674-75.
129
Id. at 675.
130
Id. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938)).
131
See id. at 679 (“In essence, every licensee would become a potential competitor
with the licensor-patent holder in the market for licenses under the patents.”).
132
Id. at 679-80.
133
See, e.g., RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257,
271 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Without [the patent holder’s] consent, [the debtor] was precluded from assuming the agreement.”); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e are bound by the plain
terms of the statute and . . . adopt[] the ‘hypothetical test.’”); City of Jamestown, Tenn.
v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537 (11th
Cir. 1994) (“The first condition [of 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)] presents a hypothetical
question . . . .”); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the
language of section 356(c)(1) supports the use of the hypothetical test).
134
See, e.g., United States v. TechDyn Sys. Corp. (In re TechDyn Sys. Corp.), 235
B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999) (applying the hypothetical test but noting that
“[the actual] test . . . has been adopted by a clear majority of the lower courts”).
128
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with the First Circuit, have adopted the actual test, which does not re135
quire explicit consent.
1. Development and Adoption of the Hypothetical Test
The hypothetical test was first introduced in In re West Electronics
136
Inc.
West was not a patent-licensing case; instead, the case involved
an executory contract for missile-launcher power-supply units between
137
a defense contractor and the United States. West, the supplier, suffered from operational problems, late deliveries, and irregularities in
138
its accounting procedures.
Upon investigation, the United States
sought to terminate the contract prior to West’s bankruptcy filing, a
fact suggesting that there was a material problem with West’s ability to
139
When West filed its bankruptcy petition and received an
perform.
automatic stay, the government sought an order to lift the stay so it
140
West contended that “it
could terminate the contract agreement.
had the capacity and intention to cure the default” and should be giv141
en the opportunity to perform. Both the bankruptcy court and the
district court on review denied the government’s motion, finding that
142
the agreement constituted an executory contract.
The issue facing the Third Circuit was whether the debtor could
assume the executory contract even if it had no intention of assigning
143
144
it to a third party. The court answered in the negative. The tension was between 41 U.S.C. § 15, which prevents transfers of government contracts to third parties, and section 365(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which provides that executory contracts are generally freely
145
The Third Circuit reversed the lower courts, holding
transferable.
that the government contract could not be assumed because “West
could not force the government to accept the ‘personal attention and

135

See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997)
(declining to follow the hypothetical test); Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d
608, 612 (1st Cir. 1995) (same).
136
852 F.2d at 83.
137
Id. at 80.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 80-81.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 81.
143
Id. at 82-83.
144
Id.
145
Id.
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146

services’ of a third party without [the government’s] consent.” West
147
was barred from assuming and assigning the contract.
In reaching
its conclusion, the court examined the plain meaning of the statute
and stated that
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test—i.e., under the applicable law, could the government refuse performance from “an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession.” . . . [T]he relevant inquiry is not whether 41 U.S.C. § 15 would preclude an assignment from
West as a debtor to West as a debtor in possession, but whether it would
148
foreclose an assignment by West to another defense contractor.

Although West did not involve a patent license, it developed the hypothetical test that was later used by the Eleventh Circuit in a case relat149
It was not until 1999 that the hypoing to a franchise agreement.
thetical test was applied in the context of patent licensing.
In In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., the Ninth Circuit expressly
adopted the hypothetical test, holding that the “applicable law,” as relating to section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, was the federal
150
common law principle of patent nonassignability.
Catapult Entertainment was in the business of creating an online gaming network for
151
Catapult also entered into two nonex16-bit console videogames.
clusive license agreements with Stephen Perlman for the use of his pa152
When Catapult filed for reorganizatents and patent applications.
tion under Chapter 11, it proposed a reorganization plan involving a
reverse triangular merger with two other companies in which Catapult
153
The reorganization
would emerge as the surviving corporation.
plan also proposed that after the merger, Catapult would assume the
154
patent licenses in order to continue operations. Catapult’s creditors
and equity holders voted in favor of the reorganization plan and the

146

Id. at 83.
Id.
148
Id. The court also held that, based upon the literal meaning of the statute and
Congress’s intent, West as a debtor and West as a debtor-in-possession were “materially
distinct entities.” Id.
149
City of Jamestown, Tenn. v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1994).
150
Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747,
750 (9th Cir. 1999).
151
Id. at 748.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 748-49.
154
Id. at 749.
147
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155

bankruptcy court confirmed it.
Perlman, however, objected to the
156
plan and appealed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the confirmation of Cata157
pult’s reorganization plan.
In doing so, the Ninth Circuit became
the first circuit court to hold that a nonexclusive patent license could
not be assumed in a bankruptcy proceeding without the consent of
158
Similar to West, the issue facing the Ninth Circuit was
the licensor.
whether Catapult, as the debtor-in-possession, could assume the Perl159
man licenses without Perlman’s consent. The court, noting the tension between the hypothetical and actual test, adopted and explained
the hypothetical test:
The literal language of § 365(c)(1) is thus said to establish a “hypothetical test”: a debtor in possession may not assume an executory contract
over the nondebtor’s objection if applicable law would bar assignment to
a hypothetical third party, even where the debtor in possession has no
160
intention of assigning the contract in question to any such third party.

Under the hypothetical test, the court ruled that Catapult could not
assume the Perlman licenses if “(A) federal patent law excuses Perlman from accepting performance from or rendering performance to
an entity other than Catapult . . . ; and (B) Perlman does not consent
161
to such assumption.” Thus, if a debtor cannot assume a license, this
is equivalent to a rejection and the license effectively terminates as a
162
matter of law upon bankruptcy, unless the licensor agrees otherwise.
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit adopted the hypothetical test in
163
RCI Technology Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.).
There,
Sunterra, the debtor, had entered into a software license agreement
with RCI in which RCI granted Sunterra a nonexclusive license for the

155

Id.
Id.
157
Id. at 748.
158
See id. at 754-55 (holding that “where applicable nonbankruptcy law makes an
executory contract nonassignable because the identity of the nondebtor party is material, a debtor in possession may not assume the contract absent consent of the nondebtor party”).
159
Id. at 749. Although Perlman also contended that section 365(c)(1) prohibited
the assignment of its licenses to the third parties involved in the reverse triangular merger, the court did not reach the issue of assignment because it barred Catapult from
even assuming the Perlman licenses. Id. at 749 n.1.
160
Id. at 750.
161
Id. at 750-51 (italics omitted).
162
See id.
163
361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004).
156
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164

use of its software.
Sunterra filed for bankruptcy and, prior to the
court’s approval of the reorganization plan, RCI filed a motion to have
the software license deemed rejected. RCI asserted that the license was
an executory contract and that Sunterra, as debtor-in-possession, was
precluded by section 365(c) from assuming the license without RCI’s
165
RCI further contended that because it had not given Sunconsent.
terra permission to assume the license, the court was required, as a
166
matter of law, to deem the license rejected.
The bankruptcy court,
167
adopting the actual test, held that section 365(c) did not prohibit
Sunterra, as debtor-in-possession, from assuming the license because
168
Sunterra never intended to assign the license to a third party. Under
this interpretation, “Sunterra, as debtor in possession, was entitled to
assume the [license] because it did not intend to assign, and RCI
would not actually be forced to accept performance from a party other
169
than Sunterra.” On review, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, ruling that because RCI would not be asked to accept performance from a party other than Sunterra, Sunterra was not prec170
luded from assuming the patent license under section 365(c).
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected the lower courts’ adoption
171
of the actual test and adopted the hypothetical test. The court, in rejecting the actual test, refused to interpret the “or” in the statutory
172
In addition, the
phrase “assume or assign” as a conjunctive “and.”
court held that federal copyright law was the “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” and thus Sunterra was precluded from assuming the nonexclu173
sive license because the federal common law prohibited assignment.

164

Id. at 260. Although In re Sunterra dealt with software licensing rather than patent licensing, the same federal principle of common law patent nonassignability applies to copyright law, because copyrights—like patents—are a form of intellectual
property governed by federal statute. See Menell, supra note 27, at 800-02 (discussing
bankruptcy’s treatment of copyright licenses and the relationship between copyright
and patent law); supra note 98 and accompanying text.
165
In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d at 261.
166
Id.
167
The bankruptcy court adopted the actual test, see infra subsection III.B.2, which
reads the disjunctive “or” in section 365(c) as a conjunctive “and.” Id. at 263.
168
Id. at 262-63.
169
Id. at 263.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 267.
172
Id.
173
See id. at 262 n.7, 271.
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2. Development and Adoption of the Actual Test
Although several circuits have adopted the hypothetical test, most
bankruptcy courts, as well as the First Circuit, have expressly rejected
174
it in favor of the actual test. Under the actual test, section 365(c) is
read in reference to the “actual” intent of the debtor with respect to
175
If the debtor has no intent to assign the liassigning the license.
cense, then section 365(c) does not prevent assumption of the li176
Under the actual test, the debtor does not need the licencense.
177
sor’s consent in order to assume the license.
The actual test was first developed by the First Circuit in Summit
178
Investment & Development Corp. v. Leroux. In Leroux, the court looked
to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code and concluded that
Congress intended section 365(c) to provide the nondebtor party with
179
the benefit of its bargain. Relying on the 1984 Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, the court noted that the change in statutory language from “debtor” to “the debtor or the debtor in possession” indicated Congress’s intent that the prohibition on assumption does not
apply when the debtor-in-possession is the party who will be performing the debtor’s duties and accepting performance from the nondeb180
The court noted that this type of analysis results in a
tor party.
“case-by-case inquiry into the actual consequences . . . to the nondeb181
tor party,” instead of the abstract rule of the hypothetical test. The
court further stated that in order to prevent assumption of the contract, the nondebtor party “must make an individualized showing that
it would not receive the ‘full benefit of [its] bargain’ were an entity to
182
be substituted for the debtor from whom performance is due.”
Although Leroux was not a patent-licensing case, it was not long
before the First Circuit applied the actual test in the context of patent
174

See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 612-14 (1st Cir. 1995)
(developing the actual test); see also Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104
F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying the actual test); cf. United States v. TechDyn
Sys. Corp. (In re TechDyn Sys. Corp), 235 B.R. 857, 860-61 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999)
(adopting the hypothetical test but noting that “[the actual] test . . . has been adopted
by a clear majority of lower courts”).
175
Leroux, 69 F.3d at 612.
176
Id.
177
See id.
178
See id. at 612-14.
179
Id. at 612-13.
180
Id. at 613 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-1195, at 12 (1980)).
181
Id.
182
Id. (alteration in original).
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rights. In Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., Cambridge Biotech
Corporation (CBC) entered into a mutual cross-license agreement
183
with Institut Pasteur. In the agreement, CBC was authorized to utilize Pasteur’s HIV diagnostic procedures in any diagnostic kits CBC
184
sold in the United States and other countries. When CBC filed for
Chapter 11, its reorganization plan proposed that it assume the license and continue to operate its diagnostics division using Pasteur’s
185
patented procedures. CBC’s reorganization plan also called for the
sale of CBC’s stock to a subsidiary of bioMerieux, one of Pasteur’s di186
Naturally, Pasteur objected to CBC’s reorganizarect competitors.
tion plan, contending that the proposed sale of CBC’s stock to bioMerieux amounted to CBC’s assumption of the cross-licenses and their
187
de facto assignment to a third party (here, bioMerieux). Of particular note, Pasteur’s licensing director “attested that Pasteur would not
have granted its competitor, bioMerieux, or a subsidiary, a patent li188
cense under the terms allowed CBC.”
Although it conceded that Pasteur’s position was understandable,
the First Circuit, following its precedent in Leroux, rejected the hypothetical test and instead ruled that there needed to be a case-by-case
inquiry into whether the nondebtor party (i.e., Pasteur) was actually
being forced to accept performance from someone (i.e., bioMerieux)
other than the party with whom it had originally contracted (i.e.,
189
CBC).
In this context, the First Circuit held that “the bankruptcy
court cannot simply presume as a matter of law that the debtor-inpossession is a legal entity materially distinct from the prepetition deb190
tor with whom the nondebtor party . . . contracted.” Rather, the focus should be “on the performance actually to be rendered by the debtor-in-possession,” and whether Pasteur would be denied the full
191
benefit of its bargain.
Surprisingly, the First Circuit also permitted CBC’s stock sale to
192
bioMerieux. In fact, the court held that the stock sale did not result
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997).
Id. at 490.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 490-91.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,

5845).
192

Id. at 494-95.
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in a “different entity” than that with which Pasteur had originally con193
tracted, even though CBC was technically now owned by bioMerieux.
Instead, the court held that because the cross-licenses contained no
provision either limiting or terminating CBC’s rights if its stock
changed hands, there was no change in beneficial ownership in Pasteur’s license agreement. Under this interpretation, Pasteur could not
194
restrict the license.
The Fifth Circuit, in Bonneville Power Administration v. Mirant Corp.
(In re Mirant Corp.), also adopted the actual test but provided a differ195
ent justification than the First Circuit.
Mirant, an electrical power
producer and seller, entered into a contract with Bonneville Power
Administration (BPA), a federal power-marketing agency within the
196
When Mirant filed for bankUnited States Department of Energy.
ruptcy, BPA sought to terminate the contract for future power purchases, asserting the right to do so under an ipso facto default provision that authorized BPA to terminate the contract upon Mirant’s
197
Mirant and BPA agreed that ipso facto clauses
bankruptcy filing.
198
were generally invalid under section 365(e).
However, they disputed whether ipso facto default provisions remained enforceable
under section 365(c) if the contract excused the nondebtor party
199
from accepting performance from a trustee or assignee.
Although Mirant was not about a patent license, the court noted
that the dispute involved essentially the same issue the apparent conflict between subsections 365(c) and 365(f) raises—namely whether a
prohibition on assignment applies in cases where no assignment is ac200
tually sought. The Fifth Circuit held that the “plain text” of section
365(e)(2) requires the use of the actual test because the prohibition
193

See id.
Id.
195
440 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2006).
196
Id. at 241.
197
Id. at 242-43. Termination upon bankruptcy provisions are often known as ipso
facto clauses (the Latin phrase meaning “by the fact itself”) because the language provides that the fact of bankruptcy itself is enough to trigger the termination of the
agreement. Generally, ipso facto clauses are unenforceable in bankruptcy under sections 541(c) and 365(e)(1). See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 40-43 (1986) ( justifying bankruptcy law’s disregard of ipso facto clauses);
Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient
Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 441-46 (1999) (discussing ipso facto clauses
under section 365(e)).
198
440 F.3d at 245.
199
Id. at 245-46.
200
Id. at 246.
194
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on assignment is “tethered . . . to ‘applicable’ law” and the “applicable
201
law must apply to a set of circumstances.” The court held that “[t]he applicability of the law under § 365(e)(2)(A) is determined not in the ab202
Furthermore, the court criticized
stract but on the record at hand.”
the hypothetical test as being too abstract and complained that it could
force courts to decide whether an assignment would be permitted, even
203
The Fifth Circuit
given circumstances not actually before the court.
was likely concerned with the prospect of rendering an advisory opinion
were it forced to rule on an assignment under a host of fact patterns not
actually presented.
C. Recent Case Law Trends in Interpretation
Although the hypothetical test is currently favored, since In re Catapult and Pasteur were decided there has been a trend toward a “plain
meaning” interpretation of section 365(c). The leading case in this
204
line of reasoning is In re Footstar, Inc.
Footstar, the debtor, had entered into a series of agreements with Kmart that provided for Kmart
to operate a separate “Shoemart Corporation” owned 51% by Footstar
205
The agreements also gave Shoemart Corporaand 49% by Kmart.
tion the exclusive right to operate footwear departments in particular
206
In addition, the agreements expressly prohibited asKmart stores.
207
signment of the contract. Thus, when Footstar filed for bankruptcy
and sought to assume the agreements, Kmart asserted that assumption
208
was prohibited.
In Footstar, Judge Hardin addressed the conflict between the actual and hypothetical tests and ultimately concluded that the actual
209
test is more appropriate.
In his analysis, however, Judge Hardin
held that neither the hypothetical nor the actual test applied. Instead,
he focused on the “plain meaning” of the statute “to reach a conclusion which is entirely harmonious with both the objective sought to be
obtained in Section 365(c)(1) and the overall objectives of the Bank-

201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
Id. at 250.
See id.
323 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 569 n.1.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 570-71.
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ruptcy Code, without construing ‘or’ to mean ‘and.’” In particular,
he held that the previous decisions were fundamentally flawed because they were based on the premise that the term “trustee” was syn211
onymous with “debtor” or “debtor in possession.” He continued by
stating that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its legislative history
212
As a
equates a “trustee” with a “debtor” or “debtor in possession.”
result, when the Code refers to both a “trustee” and a “debtor” or
213
“debtor in possession,” the two terms must have different meanings.
Accordingly, section 365(c) need not restrict assumption of the contract by the debtor-in-possession because it only refers to limitations
214
Under this
on the trustee’s ability to assume or assign the contract.
interpretation, the rights of the nondebtor party remain protected
because the nondebtor party may decline performance from a party
215
other than the debtor-in-possession. Furthermore, the debtor party
is protected by avoiding “the perverse and anomalous consequence of
the ‘hypothetical test’ rule under which a debtor may lose the benefit
of a non-assignable contract vital to its economic future solely because
216
it filed for bankruptcy.”
Bankruptcy courts have recently adopted the rationale set forth in
217
Footstar.
In In re Adelphia Communications Corp., Judge Gerber rejected the hypothetical test, concluding that the “the right to object to
218
Furtherassignment does not by itself affect the right to assume.”
more, he held that no purpose was served by disqualifying a debtor-inpossession from assuming an executory contract because “[w]hen a
debtor in possession, as contrasted to a trustee, wishes to assume, the

210

Id. at 570.
See id. at 570-71 (“To construe ‘trustee’ in Section 365(c)(1) to mean ‘debtors’
or ‘debtors in possession’ would defy the ‘plain meaning’ of the statute as written by
Congress and could be characterized as the same sort of judicial legislation as Kmart
condemns in the cases that apply the ‘actual test’ to construe ‘or’ as ‘and.’”).
212
Id. at 571.
213
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1), (e)(1)–(2), (f) (2006) (identifying distinct roles
for debtors and trustees).
214
See In re Footstar, 323 B.R. at 573-74 (“The basic objective of Section 365(c)(1)—
to protect the contract counterparty from unlawful assignment of the contract—simply
is not implicated when a debtor in possession itself seeks to assume, but not assign, the
contract.”).
215
Id. at 573.
216
Id. at 574.
217
See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 65, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(distinguishing between the assumption of a contract and the assignment of a contract).
218
Id.
211
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underlying needs and concerns to be protected have nothing to do
219
with each other.”
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico recently ap220
plied the Footstar analysis in a patent-licensing case.
Aerobox, the
debtor, entered into a nonexclusive license for the use of Tubus Bauer’s
patent rights and confidential information in manufacturing thermop221
lastic sandwich panels. The license agreement contained an ipso facto clause terminating the agreement if Aerobox became insolvent or
222
Upon Aerobox’s bankruptcy filing, Tubus
went into bankruptcy.
Bauer filed a motion seeking rejection of the license, asserting that the
223
license could not be assumed or assigned under the hypothetical test.
The court, accepting the logic of Footstar, agreed that it “makes no
sense to read ‘trustee’ to mean ‘debtor in possession’” because
224
“[d]oing so would ‘render the provision a virtual oxymoron.’” It also held that the limitations of section 365(c)(1) are directed at protecting the nondebtor party from being forced to accept performance
from an entity other than the party with whom it originally con225
Furthermore, the court agreed with the Institut Pasteur v.
tracted.
226
Cambridge Biotech Corp. decision that a debtor-in-possession “is not
materially distinct from the pre-bankruptcy entity that is a party to the
227
[license].” On these grounds, the court denied Tubus Bauer’s mo228
tion to compel rejection.
Interestingly, the court acknowledged the license agreement’s
provision requiring the licensor “not to unreasonably withhold its
229
consent to assignment.” Although the creditors’ committee argued
that this provision was less restrictive than the general federal common law and constituted either a form of “preconsent” to assumption
or an indication that the licensor had “opted out of generally applica230
ble law,” the court ultimately declined to address this point.
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

Id. at 72 n.18.
In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 373 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007).
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id. at 142 (quoting In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 573 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
Id. at 141.
104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997).
In re Aerobox, 373 B.R. at 141.
Id. at 142.
Id.; see also id. at 137 n.1 (providing the relevant provision of the license agree-

ment).
230

Id. at 142.
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Despite In re Adelphia and In re Aerobox, not all bankruptcy courts
have followed Footstar. Most notably, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania rejected the Footstar analysis in Federal
231
Insurance Co. v. Continental Casualty Co. Here, the court, noting that
the Western District of Pennsylvania’s bankruptcy courts have always
232
employed a broad interpretation of In re West Electronics, concluded
that the debtor-in-possession was “a distinct entity from the prepeti233
tion debtor.” The court, however, also went on to discuss the uncertainty surrounding the treatment of the debtor and the debtor-in234
possession as distinct legal entities.
IV. INTERPRETING SECTION 365(C): IS THE “OR” REALLY AN “AND”?
A. The “or” as a Disjunctive “or”
The plain-meaning rule of statutory interpretation requires that
when the statutory language “is plain and admits of no more than one
235
The
meaning,” the court should not try to “interpret” the statute.
language of section 365(c) reads, in part, that “[t]he trustee may not
236
Alassume or assign any executory contract . . . of the debtor.”
though the statute clearly says “assume or assign,” the dispute between
the hypothetical and actual tests centers on whether the “or” in the
237
phrase should be read as a disjunctive “or” or as a conjunctive “and.”
Proponents of the hypothetical test argue that the test is premised
on a literal interpretation of the statute—namely, reading the “or” as a
238
disjunctive “or.” Reading the “or” literally, section 365(c) states that
231

No. 05-0305, 2006 WL 3386625 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2006).
852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1988).
233
Cont’l Cas., 2006 WL 3386625, at *15.
234
Id.; see also Biltmore Assoc., L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 05-4220, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56034, at *13 n.4 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 21, 2006) (“The distinction between a debtor and a debtor in possession is nuanced and unclear, and has yielded varying results in district courts, among the circuits, and within the Ninth Circuit.”). But
see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (recognizing that upon filing for bankruptcy, an estate is
created with a different legal character than that of the prepetition debtor).
235
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also Hillman v. IRS,
263 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nless there is some ambiguity in the language
of a statute, a court’s analysis must end with the statute’s plain language . . . .”).
236
11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (emphasis added).
237
See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 262
nn.8-9 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining the difference between the hypothetical and actual
tests).
238
See id. at 262 n.8 (stating that the test construes the “or” “to mean what it says”);
City of Jamestown, Tenn. v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners,
232
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239

the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession can neither assume
nor assign an executory contract if “applicable law excuses a party,
other than the debtor, . . . from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor
in possession . . . [and] such party does not consent to such assump240
tion or assignment.” Therefore, under this interpretation, the act of
assuming an executory contract is an event separate and distinct from assigning the executory contract. It follows that the conditions of section
365(c)(1) must apply equally to both the assumption and assignment
241
prongs. Accordingly, a debtor must reject the contract if applicable
242
law forbids the debtor from assuming or assigning the contract.
Applying the conditions of section 365(c)(1) to the assumption
prong of section 365(c), the statute would read, “The trustee may not
assume . . . any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor . . .
if applicable law excuses a party . . . from accepting performance from
or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the
243
debtor in possession.”
In the context of patent licensing, the applicable law is the federal
common law principle of patent nonassignability, which forbids the
debtor from transferring the license without the licensor’s explicit
L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537 (11th Cir. 1994) (interpreting the statute as requiring the court
to answer a “hypothetical question”); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988)
(“11 U.S.C. § 361(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test—i.e., under the applicable law,
could the government refuse performance from an entity other than the debtor or the
debtor in possession.”); In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 48-49 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1999) (following the Third Circuit’s adoption of the hypothetical test). Critics of
the hypothetical test/literal-meaning reading concede that section 365(c) is written in
the disjunctive and, therefore, by its plain language, would prohibit a debtor from “assuming or assigning.” In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 265. They contend, however, that the
plain-meaning rule does not apply to section 365(c) because it would create inconsistencies within the Code. See discussion infra subsection IV.B.1.
239
As noted before, the term “trustee” as used in the statute includes a Chapter 11
debtor-in-possession. In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 261 n.5; Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t,
Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999); see also discussion
supra note 42 (discussing the powers and rights of a bankruptcy trustee and a debtorin-possession).
240
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1). Although section 365(c) provides three different conditions under which a trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract, this
Comment is only concerned with the first condition, as it is the only condition relevant
to patent licensing.
241
See id. § 365(c)(1)(A); 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 5-15, at 474
(1992) (noting that the plain language of section 365(c)(1) “link[s] nonassignability
under ‘applicable law’ together with a prohibition on assumption in bankruptcy”).
242
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c); In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 269 (holding that construing section 365(c) to mean “assumption and assignment” would intrude on legislative function).
243
Id. § 365(c)(1)(A).
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244

consent.
As courts have held, in order for a patent owner to exercise its right to exclude to the fullest extent, the patent owner must be
245
able to control the identity of its licensees. Because a patent license
is merely a covenant not to sue for infringement, the patent owner
cannot be forced to accept performance of the license from any party
246
other than the one with whom it originally contracted. If the patent
owner were forced to accept performance from a different party, then
the owner would effectively lose control of its monopolistic right to
247
exclude others from practicing the patented invention. Forcing the
patent owner to accept performance from a third party would result in
the patent owner forgoing its right to sue the third party for patent in248
Thus, because the “applicable law” of patent nonassigfringement.
nability prevents the patent owner from having to accept performance
from a third-party entity (i.e., a party other than the debtor or debtorin-possession), the debtor (i.e., the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-inpossession) cannot assume the patent license.
A patent owner is not required to accept performance of the license from an entity other than the entity with which it originally con249
tracted. In fact, because the debtor-in-possession is a separate legal
entity from the original debtor, the patent owner can only accept performance from the postpetition debtor-in-possession if there is an implicit assumption and assignment of the license from the original deb244

See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 271 F.3d 1081, 1088-89
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing the principle of nontransferability of patents found in federal common law), vacated on other grounds en banc, 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002); cf. In
re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (describing the nontransferability of
government contracts).
245
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
246
See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, 271 F.3d at 1088 (noting that allowing free assignability
of patent licenses would result in the patent holder losing “the very important ability to
control the identity of the licensees”); Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrack Corp. (In re CFLC,
Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) (relying on the federal patent policy concern
that the patent holder have the ability to control the identity of licensees and holding
that nonexclusive patent licenses are not assignable).
247
See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, 271 F.3d at 1088 (noting that permitting free assignability would mean “every licensee would become a potential competitor with the licensorpatent holder in the market for the invention; and even if the patentee could control
the number of licenses, he would lose the very important ability to control the identity
of the licensees”).
248
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (stating that a party that “makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention” without authority infringes the patent).
249
See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, 271 F.3d at 1088 (“[P]atent licenses are . . . nontransferable in the absence of an agreement authorizing assignment . . . .”); In re CFLC,
89 F.3d at 679 (stating that a nonexclusive patent license cannot be assigned without
the authorization of the patent owner).
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250

tor to the debtor-in-possession. If section 365(c)(1)(A) did not contain the language “debtor or debtor in possession,” it is likely that the
federal common law principle of patent nonassignability would also forbid assumption of the license on the ground that the debtor is no longer
251
the same legal entity as it was before it entered into bankruptcy.
Having established that section 365(c) prevents assumption of the
patent license, I turn to whether assignment of the license would be
252
permitted. Applying the conditions of subsection (1) to the assignment prong, section 365(c)(1)(A) reads, “The trustee may not . . . assign . . . any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor . . . if
applicable law excuses a party . . . from accepting performance from
or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the
253
debtor in possession.”
The analysis set forth in the assumption prong also applies to the
assignment prong. Under the patent nonassignability principle, the
debtor-licensee does not have any property rights in the patent and,
therefore, cannot assign the patent license to a third party without the
254
licensor’s explicit consent. The identity of the third party—whether
the third-party assignee is real or hypothetical—is irrelevant because in
the absence of the licensor’s explicit consent, the debtor-licensee simp255
ly cannot make an assignment. Thus, the “applicable law” of patent
nonassignability means the licensor does not have to accept perfor-

250

See supra Section I.A.
See Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747,
754-55 (9th Cir. 1999) (preventing the debtor from assuming the patent licenses); In
re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]n the context of the assumption
and assignment of executory contracts, a solvent contractor and an insolvent debtor in
possession going through bankruptcy are materially distinct entities.”). But see Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 F.3d 238, 248 (5th Cir.
2006) (citing cases in which courts have held that the solvent contractor and insolvent
debtor-in-possession going through bankruptcy are not different entities for purposes
of the antiassignment principle).
252
See, e.g., In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750 (noting that section 365(c)(1) “bars a
debtor in possession from assuming an executory contract without the nondebtor’s
consent where applicable law precludes assignment of the contract to a third party”).
253
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2006).
254
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
255
See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 266
(4th Cir. 2004) (“Subsection (c)(1) bars assumption (absent consent) when ‘applicable law’ would bar an assignment.”); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750 (“[T]he statute by
its terms bars a debtor in possession from assuming an executory contract without the
nondebtor’s consent . . . .”); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d at 83 (“[T]he debtor in possession was not entitled to assume the contract without the [licensor’s] consent . . . .”).
251
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mance from an entity other than the debtor or debtor-in-possession,
thereby preventing the debtor from assigning the patent license.
Under a literal interpretation of the Code, section 365(c) forbids
the debtor from either assuming or assigning the patent license. This
prohibition would apply even where the debtor-in-possession has no
256
intention of assigning the contract in question to any real third party.
B. The “or” as a Conjunctive “and”
Critics of the hypothetical test argue that the disjunctive “or” must
257
be read as a conjunctive “and.” Although these critics acknowledge
that section 365(c) is, in fact, constructed in the disjunctive and by its
plain language prohibits assumption or assignment, they maintain that
the plain-meaning rule should not apply for three reasons: (1) the
literal reading creates inconsistencies within the Code, (2) the literal
reading is incompatible with the legislative history of section 365, and
258
In(3) the literal reading goes against sound bankruptcy policy.
stead, they argue that the proper interpretation of section 365(c) requires a case-by-case inquiry into whether the nondebtor’s contract
will actually be assigned, or whether the nondebtor will actually be
asked to accept performance from a third party other than the debtor
259
As will be discussed, however, these arguor debtor-in-possession.
ments do not justify departing from the plain-meaning rule, and the
literal reading of section 365(c) must prevail.

256

See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 262 n.8 (finding the intent of the debtor-inpossession to assign to a third party irrelevant if the statute is read literally).
257
See Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 F.3d
238, 249 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopting the actual test); In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 265-68
(detailing the argument that certain conflicts within the statute preclude a plainmeaning reading of the statute); Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 61213 (1st Cir. 1995) (preferring the actual test).
258
See In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 751 (detailing the debtor’s arguments against the
use of the plain-meaning rule); see also Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp.,
104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting the hypothetical test in favor of a case-bycase approach); Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249, 1252 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that “literal” interpretations that lead to absurd results should be avoided). But see Leroux, 69
F.3d at 610 (“Plain statutory language does not prompt recourse to countervailing legislative history.”).
259
See In re Mirant, 440 F.3d at 248 (emphasizing the importance of whether a contract will actually be assigned or whether a nondebtor will actually be forced to accept
performance from a third party); Leroux, 69 F.3d at 612-13 (interpreting the legislative
history to require “a case-by-case inquiry into the actual consequences . . . of permitting
these executory contracts to be performed by the debtor party”).
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1. Does the Literal Reading Create Inconsistencies?
a. Section 365(c)’s Interaction with Section 365(f)(1)
Proponents of the actual test contend that a literal reading of section 365(c) would implicate the absurdity exception to the plain260
meaning rule of statutory interpretation. In order to achieve internal consistency, they argue, the court must interpret the statute so as
261
Specifically, they
to minimize discord among related provisions.
maintain that a literal reading of section 365(c) would render section
262
365(f)(1) inoperative and superfluous.
Subsection (f)(1) provides that executory contracts, once assumed,
may be assigned notwithstanding any contrary provisions contained in
the contract or applicable law:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the
assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such con263
tract or lease under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

The conflict arises from subsections (c)(1) and (f)(1)’s treatment of
“applicable law.” The plain language of subsection (c)(1) bars as264
sumption whenever “applicable law” would bar assignment. Subsection (f)(1), however, states that executory contracts may be assigned,
265
contrary provisions in applicable law notwithstanding. But, in order for a

260

See Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that an
exception to application of a statute’s plain language exists when “a literal reading of a
statute . . . results in an outcome that can truly be characterized as absurd, i.e., that is ‘so
gross as to shock the general moral or common sense’” (citation omitted) (quoting Md.
State Dep’t of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 98 F.3d 165, 169 (4th Cir. 1996)).
261
See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2007) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the
result of obvious mistake or error.” (footnotes omitted)).
262
See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 265-66 (discussing the “seemingly warring provisions of § 365(c)(1) and § 365(f)(1)”); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 751 (noting that “a
literal reading of subsection (c)(1) appears to render subsection (f)(1) superfluous”);
see also Breeden v. Catron (In re Catron), 158 B.R. 629, 636-37 (E.D. Va. 1993) (exploring the apparent conflict between subsections (c)(1) and (f)(1)); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 976-77 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (examining the trustee’s argument that (c)(1) and (f)(1) conflict).
263
11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2006).
264
Id. § 365(c)(1); see also discussion supra Section IV.A.
265
11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1).
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contract to be assigned, the debtor must first assume it.
A literal
reading of section 365(c)(1) would thus render section 365(f)(1) in267
operative and superfluous.
The Sixth Circuit, however, reconciled the two provisions in In re
268
Magness, noting that “each subsection recognizes an ‘applicable law’
269
of markedly different scope.”
Subsection (f)(1) states the default
rule by nullifying applicable law that “prohibits, restricts, or conditions
270
the assignment of” an executory contract. Subsection (c), however,
271
functions as an exception to this default rule. As noted by one circuit court, “Thus, the ‘applicable law’ to which subsection (c) refers
must mean ‘applicable law’ other than general prohibitions barring
272
In fact, the exception under subsection (c) does not
assignment.”
merely refer to law that generally bans assignment of executory contracts but instead that more specifically “excuses a party . . . from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity”
273
The appliother than the one with whom it originally contracted.
cable law referred to in subsection (c) prevails over subsection
274
(f)(1). As a result, the two subsections do not conflict. Under the
default rule defined in subsection (f)(1), “applicable law” is law that

266

See id. § 365(f)(2)(A) (providing that the trustee may assign an executory contract if the trustee first assumes such a contract in accordance with the provisions of
section 365).
267
See In re Catron, 158 B.R. at 636 (concluding that the “[c]onflict between subsections (c) and (f) of § 365 is inescapable”).
268
Rieser v. Dayton Country Club Co. (In re Magness), 972 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.
1992).
269
Id. at 695; see also City of Jamestown, Tenn. v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re
James Cable Partners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537-38 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that subsections (c) and (f) refer to different applicable law); In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. 443, 448 (D.
Md. 1992) (stating that the distinction drawn in In re Magness is correct), aff’d, 4 F.3d
984 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Lil’ Things, Inc., 220 B.R. 583, 590-91 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998)
(agreeing that (f)(1) states the general rule and that (c)(1)(A) is an exception to it).
270
See In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 695 (acknowledging subsection (f) as the default);
see also In re James Cable, 27 F.3d at 538 (same).
271
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (applying the default rule “[e]xcept as provided in
subsection[] . . . (c) of this section”).
272
In re James Cable, 27 F.3d at 538.
273
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A); see also RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that subsection (c) recognizes a specific exception to the broad rule pronounced in subsection (f)); In re James Cable, 27 F.3d at 538 (holding that the applicable law referred to in subsection (c) does not
include general prohibitions on assignments); In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 695 (asserting
that subsection (c) refers to laws other than those generally prohibiting assignments).
274
In re James Cable, 27 F.3d at 538 (noting that subsection (c) permits diminishing
the trustee’s power to assume or assign that is otherwise honored by subsection (f)).
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generally prohibits or restricts assignments, while the “applicable law”
provision of subsection (c) refers to “legal excuses for refusing to
render or accept performance, regardless of the contract’s status as
275
‘assignable.’”
To determine whether subsection (f)(1) nullifies a law prohibiting assignments, a court must inquire into why “applicable law” prohi276
bits the assignment. Section 365(c) provides an exception to the default rule only where the law prohibits assignment of the contract on
the rationale that the identity of the contracting party is material to the
277
The federal common
agreement and is therefore “non-delegable.”
law principle of patent nonassignability states that a patent owner is not
required to accept performance of the license from an entity other than
278
This principle fits
the entity with which it originally contracted.
squarely within the exception given by section 365(c) because the identity of the debtor-licensee is, in fact, material to the underlying li279
Accordingly, reading section 365(c) to prevent the debtorcense.
licensee from assuming or assigning the patent license without the patent owner’s consent neither creates inconsistency with section
280
365(f)(1) nor renders subsection (f)(1) inoperative or superfluous.
b. Section 365(c)’s Interaction with Section 365(e)
Proponents of the actual test also contend that a literal reading of
section 365(c) is incompatible with section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy

275

In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 699 (Guy, J., concurring).
See Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747,
752 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[I]n determining whether an ‘applicable law’ stands or falls under
§ 365(f)(1), a court must ask why the ‘applicable law’ prohibits assignment.”); In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) (discussing why a provision in the Uniform
Partnership Act prohibits assignment in order to determine which subsection to apply),
aff’d, 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993).
277
See In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 700 (Guy, J., concurring) (arguing that section
365(c) sought to preserve contracts in which the identity of the original contracting party was material and there was a right of refusal); In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. at 448 (noting
that section 365(c) applies “where contracts are held to be non-assignable because they
impose upon the debtor duties which are said to be ‘non-delegable’”).
278
See supra Section III.A (discussing the federal common law principle of patent
nonassignability).
279
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (concluding that a patent owner’s
right to exclude includes the right to control its licensee’s identity).
280
See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257,
266-67 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding that subsections (c) and (f) are not irreconcilable
when applied to a software license agreement); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 752 (concluding that section 365(c) is not at odds with section 365(f)).
276
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Code, which prohibits enforcement of ipso facto clauses in bankrupt281
cy proceedings. Section 365(e)(1)(B) states,
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired
lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated or modified, at
any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on . . . the commence282
ment of a case under this title.

Section 365(e) provides an exception to the general anti–ipso facto
rule in subsection (e)(2)(A): “Paragraph (1) of this subsection does
not apply to an executory contract . . . if (A)(i) applicable law excuses a
party . . . from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the trustee or to an assignee of such contract . . . and (ii) such party does not con283
sent to such assumption or assignment . . . .” Critics of the hypothetical test, which is premised on a literal reading, argue that the
subsection (e)(2)(A) exception requires that the nondebtor party
make an “actual showing—prior to any termination of the debtor’s
postpetition contract rights—that the nondebtor party . . . would not
be forced to accept performance under its executory contract from
someone other than the debtor party with whom it originally con284
tracted.” Thus, they argue that the hypothetical test is inappropriate
because, unless the nondebtor party can make a showing of the debtor’s actual intent to assign the contract, the subsection (e)(2)(A) ex285
If the subsection (e)(2)(A) exception
ception cannot be triggered.
is not triggered, then the anti–ipso facto provision of subsection
(e)(1)(A) will remain in effect, leaving the statute at odds with the an286
tiassignment provision of subsection (c)(1)(A).

281

See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 612 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that “[a] proper construction of section 365(e)[] requires consideration of companion section 365(c)”).
282
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B) (2006).
283
Id. § 365(e)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
284
Leroux, 69 F.3d at 612.
285
See id. (holding that the exception to the anti–ipso facto rule was only intended
to prevent the nondebtor from being at the debtor’s mercy “by what amounts to an actual ‘assignment’”).
286
See id. at 613 (noting that if section 365(e)(2)(A) automatically terminated a
debtor’s executory contract rights, the exception would conflict with subsection
(c)(1)); see also Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440
F.3d 238, 248-49 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopting the actual test because the alternative
would create conflict with subsection (c)(1)).
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Such an interpretation is premised on the notion that subsection
(e)(2)(A) must be actually triggered. According to the statute, there
are two situations in which the exception applies: (1) when applicable
law excuses a party from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to the trustee, and (2) when applicable law excuses a party from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an
287
assignee of a contract.
Supporters of the actual test argue that the subsection (e)(2)(A)
exception does not apply in the context of patent licensing because
“applicable law” does not excuse the nondebtor party from accepting
288
performance from the trustee.
This, however, is a faulty assumption
when the “applicable law” in question is the federal common law principle of patent nonassignability. This principle protects a nondebtor
licensor from having to accept performance of the license by an entity
289
The prebanother than that with which it originally contracted.
kruptcy debtor, however, is not the same legal entity as the debtor-in290
possession or trustee. Thus, the “applicable law” of patent nonassignability does, in fact, prevent a nondebtor licensor from having to accept performance from the debtor-in-possession or trustee. The nondebtor patent licensor, then, falls within the exception to the general
prohibition on ipso facto clauses set forth in section 365(e)(2)(A).
Furthermore, the federal principle of patent nonassignability also
implicates the second situation in which section 365(e)(2)(A) applies.
The principle forbids the assignment of patent licenses without the
291
explicit consent of the patent owner. Thus, the “applicable law” of
patent nonassignability also protects the nondebtor licensor from having to accept performance from an assignee of the license, because
the debtor-licensee cannot assign the patent license without the con292
The identity of the third-party assent of the nondebtor licensor.
signee—whether real or speculative—is irrelevant, because the debtor287

11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(A)(i).
See In re Mirant Corp., 440 F.3d at 248-49.
289
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (emphasizing that a patent owner’s
exclusive right to an invention necessarily provides control over the identity of the performing party of a license).
290
See discussion supra Section II.D (recognizing that a prebankruptcy petition debtor is a different legal entity than a postbankruptcy petition debtor by reference to section 541(a)).
291
See id. (describing the patent owner’s exclusive right to determine who receives
an assignment).
292
See supra note 91 (listing cases that recognize that licensees must get the licensor’s consent before assigning a license).
288
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licensee simply cannot assign the license to a third-party assignee.
There is no need to require an actual showing that the debtor-licensee
intends to transfer the license to a third-party assignee, because the
debtor-licensee cannot act without the licensor’s consent. Based upon
this protection, the federal common law of patent nonassignability also falls within the second situation in which the exception under sec294
Accordingly, the anti–ipso facto provition 365(e)(2)(A) applies.
295
sions of section 365(e)(1) are not implicated.
When the federal common law principle of patent nonassignability constitutes “applicable law” under section 365(e)(2)(A), both situations in which the exception to the general anti–ipso facto provision
of section 365(e)(1) applies are met. The carve out in subsection
(e)(2)(A) then protects the nondebtor party from having to accept
performance from, or render performance to, a party with whom
296
there was no original contract. Similar to the so-called “conflict” between section 365(e) and section 365(f), when the identity of the party
from whom the nondebtor party must accept or to whom the nondebtor party must render performance is material, “applicable law” will
protect the nondebtor party from having to honor the contract when
297
the party is no longer the originally contracted party. As the courts
have held, when “applicable law” serves to protect the nondebtor party
298
in this specific manner, the provisions of section 365(c) will apply.
293

See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 271
(4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the license owner had not consented to assumption by a
third party and that assumption was therefore invalid); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t,
Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing
that without consent of the licensor, assignment to third party was invalid); In re W.
Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting a debtor’s inability to assign licenses
to third parties unilaterally).
294
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(A) (2006).
295
See id. § 365(e)(1).
296
Cf. In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 262-63 (explaining that under one test but not the
other, the licensor, would be held excused from its agreement to protect it from nonconsensual assignment to a third party); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750 (“[T]he statute
by its terms bars a debtor in possession from assuming an executory contract without
the nondebtor’s consent where applicable law precludes assignment of the contract to a
third party.”); In re W. Elecs., 852 F.2d at 83 (same).
297
See Rieser v. Dayton Country Club Co. (In re Magness), 972 F.2d 689, 699-700
(6th Cir. 1992) (Guy, J., concurring) (finding that where the identity of the original
contracting party was material, section 365(c) sought to preserve a right of refusal); In
re Antonelli, 148 B.R. 443, 448 (D. Md. 1992) (noting that section 365(c) applies where
contracts are held to be nonassignable because they impose upon the debtor duties
which are said to be “non-delegable”), aff’d, 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993).
298
See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 262; In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750; In re W. Elecs.,
852 F.2d at 83.
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Thus, there is no conflict between section 365(c), which prohibits
the assignment of contracts, and section 365(e), which nullifies ipso facto clauses. Instead, section 365(c) operates in conjunction with section
365(e): when the section 365(e)(2)(A) exception is triggered, section
365(e)(1) no longer applies.
2. The Legislative History of Section 365
As a matter of statutory construction, when a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that re299
course to the statute’s legislative history is inappropriate. A court can
only look beyond an unambiguous statute to consult legislative history if
a literal reading of the statute produces an outcome that is “demonstrably at odds” with clearly expressed congressional intent or results in an
absurd outcome—one that is “so gross as to shock the general moral or
300
301
Such instances, however, are exceptionally rare.
common sense.”
Generally, the courts have held that the intent of Congress as a whole is
more apparent from the words of a statute itself than from a patchwork
record of statements; there is a “strong presumption that Congress ex302
presses its intent through the language it chooses.”
Proponents of the actual test argue that the literal reading of sec303
tion 365(c) is at odds with the legislative history of the statute. Section 365(c), as it presently reads, was added to the Bankruptcy Code
in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
304
The 1984 Act was enacted primarily to rectify the con(1984 Act).
299

See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (“[T]his Court has repeated
with some frequency: ‘Where, as here, the resolution of a question of federal law turns
on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and
then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.’” (quoting Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984))).
300
Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930); see also United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
301
See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978) (explaining that
courts should look beyond the text only in exceptional cases).
302
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987).
303
See, e.g., Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 F.3d
238, 249-51 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopting the actual test based on an interpretation of Congress’s intent and the legislative history of section 365(c)). Where a court has adopted
the hypothetical test, litigants often advocate for adoption of the actual test following a
similar line of reasoning as the Mirant court. See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 269-70 (stating that the proponent of the actual test argued that it was “‘far more harmonious’ with
bankruptcy policy” and Congress’s intent); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 753 (recalling that
the litigants argued that the “legislative history requires disregard of the plain language
of § 365(c)(1)” and thus the court should adopt the actual test).
304
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
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stitutional crisis stemming from the Supreme Court’s decision in
305
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
It also
served to address the Court’s decision allowing bankruptcy trustees to
reject collective bargaining agreements in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildis306
Congress simultaneously took the opportunity to incorporate
co.
several other acts involving the Bankruptcy Code, many of which had
307
been pending in Congress.
Section 362(a) of the 1984 Act amended 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A)
by substituting the phrase “an entity other than the debtor or the deb308
tor in possession” for the words “the trustee.” There is, however, no
309
legislative history for the 1984 Act relevant to section 365. Given the
urgency with which the 1984 Act was passed, its legislative “history” is
comprised solely of statements inserted, rather than actually read, into
310
the Congressional Record. Likewise, there is no authoritative legislative history for the 1984 versions of its component acts. The 1984 Act
originated in a 1980 House amendment to an earlier Senate bill that
sought to “correct technical errors, clarify and make minor substantive
311
The 1980 House
changes” to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
amendment was accompanied by “a relatively obscure committee re312
port” stating,
This amendment makes it clear that the prohibition against a trustee’s
power to assume an executory contract does not apply where it is the
debtor that is in possession and the performance to be given or received
under a personal service contract will be the same as if no petition had
313
been filed because of the personal service nature of the contract.

Courts that adopt the actual test in favor of the hypothetical test
314
tend to rely upon this 1980 report for support. According to them,
the statement clearly indicates that Congress did not intend section
305

458 U.S. 50 (1982).
465 U.S. 513 (1984).
307
In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 978-80 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (recounting the legislative history of the 1984 Act).
308
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (1982), with Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec. 362(a),
§ 365(c)(1)(A), 98 Stat. at 362.
309
See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 270
(4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that there is no legislative history relevant to the alterations
made to section 365 in the 1984 Act).
310
130 CONG. REC. 20,206-34 (1984); 130 CONG. REC. 20,080-94 (1984), reprinted
in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. 4, pt. xx (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).
311
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1195, at 1 (1980).
312
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 241, § 5-15, at 475.
313
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1195, at 12.
314
See, e.g., Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 613 (1st Cir. 1995).
306
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365(c)(1) to preclude assumption of an otherwise nonassignable personal service contract if “the performance to be given or received . . .
315
will be the same as if no petition had been filed.” Rather, they maintain that “§ 365(c)(1) provides that a debtor in possession can assume
a personal service contract that is nonassignable . . . as long as its per316
formance [would] be the same as if no petition had been filed.”
Furthermore, these courts note that the actual language of subsection (c)(1) says “the debtor or the debtor in possession” and not simp317
ly “the debtor in possession.” To them, neither a debtor nor a debtor-in-possession is barred from assuming the underlying contract
318
Accordingly, in their view, the hypothetical
under section 365(c).
test is inappropriate because the debtor should not be prohibited
from simply assuming the contract when Congress clearly intended to
319
allow such an assumption.
A literal reading of the statute, however, does not produce an absurd outcome that is “demonstrably at odds” with its legislative history.
The single statement made in the 1980 House amendment report is
320
not enough to render the literal reading of section 365(c) improper.
In general, a court should not look to the legislative history of a statute
321
if there is no ambiguity in the statute’s plain language. A court may
only depart from the plain-meaning rule where the legislative history
clearly indicates that Congress intended something other than what the
322
statute actually says. Even if legislative history suggests an interpreta315

Id. at 613 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1195, at 12).
In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 979 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
317
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2006).
318
See Leroux, 69 F.3d at 613.
319
See id.
320
See In re Cardinal, 116 B.R. at 979 (acknowledging that “[s]ection 365(c) continues to bar the trustee from assuming a contract in those cases where applicable law
excuses the nondebtor from accepting performance from the trustee”).
321
See, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 n.3 (1989) (“Legislative history is irrelevant to the interpretation of an unambiguous statute.”).
322
See City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (addressing the near-total exclusivity of unambiguous statutory language); California v.
Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., 104 F.3d 1507, 1515 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Because we conclude that the language of these sections is not ambiguous, we must follow the plain
language of these sections unless the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress
intended otherwise.”); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991) (holding that an
administrative agency’s construction of a statute “may not be disturbed as an abuse of
discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the plain language of the statute and
does not otherwise conflict with Congress’ expressed intent”); Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)
(concluding that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
316
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tion contrary to a statute’s plain meaning, that is “not necessarily suffi323
cient to override the Plain Meaning Rule.”
Here, there is only a single statement, made in a “relatively ob324
scure committee report,” that suggests any intent contrary to the literal reading of section 365(c). Further, this committee report was
part of the legislative history of the 1980 House amendment, not the
actual 1984 Act passed by Congress. As the record reflects, there is
remarkably little, if any, legislative history that would enable definitive
statements regarding Congress’s intent. Thus, though the committee
report’s statement is worthy of consideration, it is not the sort of conclusive legislative history that would trump the plain language of the
325
There is no clear indication that Congress intended somestatute.
thing other than the disjunctive “or” language of section 365(c). Had
Congress intended the “or” to be read as a conjunctive “and,” it would
326
have written or amended the statute to read “assume and assign.”
Since Congress has not amended section 365(c) in this respect, a
court is “not free to replace . . . [a statute’s plain meaning] with an
327
unenacted legislative intent.” When the terms of a statute are clear
and unambiguous, a court’s inquiry ends, and it has the duty of en328
forcing the terms of the statute as Congress has drafted it.

serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress”).
323
RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 270
(4th Cir. 2004); see also Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 306 (4th Cir. 2000)
(declining to rely on legislative history to displace the plain meaning of a statute, particularly because such history consisted of only a statement made by a single member
of Congress), aff’d sub nom. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002).
324
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 241, § 5-15, at 475.
325
See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76-78 (1984) (declining to allow “snippet[s]” of legislative history to undermine the statute’s plain language); U.S. Dep’t of
State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600 (1982) (“Passing references and isolated
phrases are not controlling when analyzing a legislative history.”).
326
See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo,
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))).
327
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1064 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
328
See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.,
530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000))); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“[T]he
sole function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.”).
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Furthermore, the literal reading of section 365(c) hardly results in
an outcome that can be characterized as “absurd”—an outcome that
329
The statute limits
“shock[s] the general moral or common sense.”
the trustee’s or debtor-in-possession’s power to assume or assign a
contract by confirming the nondebtor’s rights under applicable non330
bankruptcy law. This limitation prevents the trustee from assuming
or assigning the contract because, in either case, the nondebtor party
would be forced to accept performance by “an entity other than the
331
Similarly, when the limitation
debtor or the debtor in possession.”
is applied to the debtor party itself, the debtor-in-possession cannot
assign the contract because the nondebtor party would still be forced
to accept performance from a party with which it did not originally
332
In the context of patent licensing, where the “applicable
contract.
law” is the federal common law principle of patent nonassignability,
these limitations are of particular importance due to the materiality of
333
Thus, the literal reading of section 365(c)
the licensee’s identity.
does not result in an “absurd” outcome. Rather, the outcome protects
the nondebtor party’s ability to receive “the full benefit of [its] bar334
gain” were a third party to be substituted for the debtor from whom
performance is sought.
As noted by several courts, the language of section 365(c) is clear
335
and unambiguous. Nevertheless, even if the language left room for
ambiguity such that a court should turn to the legislative history for

329

Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930); see also United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (“The plain meaning of legislation should be
conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))).
330
See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 26970 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the language of section 365(c) should be interpreted
by literally reading its text because the legislative history does not conclusively indicate
contrary intent).
331
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2006).
332
See id. (preventing a trustee from assuming or assigning an executory contract
if “applicable law excuses a party . . . from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession”).
333
For a discussion of the rationale behind the bar on assigning patents, see supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
334
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5845.
335
See, e.g., In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 265 (acknowledging that both parties agreed
that a literal reading of the statute prohibits “assuming or assigning” an agreement);
Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 751 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“Catapult urges us to abandon the literal language of § 365(c)(1) in favor
of an alternative approach . . . .”).
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guidance, there is little evidence to suggest that the court should depart from the default rule of applying the statute’s plain meaning. The
literal reading of section 365(c) is neither at odds with its legislative
history nor results in an “absurd” outcome that would “shock the gen336
eral moral or common sense.” Thus, there is no reason for a court to
337
depart from the plain-meaning rule when interpreting the statute.
3. The Literal Reading and General Bankruptcy Policies
Proponents of the actual test also contend that “a literal reading
of [section 365(c)] conflicts with general bankruptcy policy, implicating the absurdity and intent exceptions to the [plain-meaning
338
rule].” They maintain that the literal reading undermines “the general bankruptcy policy of fostering a successful reorganization and
maximizing the value of the debtor’s assets,” because it undermines
339
the debtor party’s ability to restructure itself effectively. The literal
reading of section 365(c) prevents a debtor party from assuming a patent license, even in situations where the debtor party has no intention of actually assigning the patent license to a real third party. Under the statute, the nondebtor licensor can compel rejection of the
patent license. Without the ability to assume and continue using the
license, the debtor loses a substantial asset that could seriously affect
340
its ability to conduct business.
Unsurprisingly, as the case law has demonstrated, bankruptcy
courts tend to favor the actual test rather than a literal reading under
341
the hypothetical test.
Nevertheless, even if there were merit to the
336

Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930).
See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 268 (noting that “[i]n assessing whether a plain
reading of a statute implicates the absurdity exception, however, the issue is not
whether the result would be ‘unreasonable,’ or even ‘quite unreasonable,’ but whether
the result would be absurd”).
338
Id. at 267-68; see also In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 976 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1990) (“The literal application of these provisions, argues the Trustee, makes no
sense. Therefore, the [Trustee argues that the] Court must look to the legislative history
and ascertain the intent of Congress.”); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.06[1][d][iii]
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Summer eds., 15th rev. ed. 2009) (arguing that sound
bankruptcy policy supports the actual test).
339
In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 268; see also supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
340
See, e.g., Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 490-91 (1st
Cir. 1997) (describing how the patent licenses in question were essential to the debtor’s line of business).
341
See, e.g., Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440
F.3d 238, 254-55 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding the bankruptcy court’s application of the
actual test); In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 261-63 (noting that the bankruptcy court and
337
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public policy argument against enforcement of the statute, “such arguments must necessarily fail in the face of an unambiguous sta342
As noted by the Supreme Court, if poor policy choices protute.”
duce undesirable results, it is up to Congress, not the courts, to amend
343
the statute.
Only Congress can modify a statutory provision to
344
achieve a preferable policy outcome.
Under the advocated actual test, the disjunctive “or” of section
365(c) would be read as a conjunctive “and,” thereby effectively read345
ing the term “assume” out of the statute. Such an interpretation results in “the statute only prohibit[ing] assumption and assignment, as
346
Reading the “or” as a conopposed to assumption or assignment.”
junctive “and” creates a much narrower exception under section
365(c)(1). Accordingly, the actual test’s interpretation affords the
debtor party a much broader scope of protection than the literal reading of the statute provides. While this interpretation may be appealing from a bankruptcy policy perspective, a court “cannot adopt [such
an interpretation] . . . without trespassing on a function reserved for
347
the legislative branch.” A federal court’s function is limited to “determin[ing] the meaning of the statute passed by Congress, not
whether wisdom or logic suggests that Congress could have done bet348
Thus, even though a literal reading of the statute may not be
ter.”
district court chose to apply the actual test instead of the hypothetical test); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 755 (concluding that the bankruptcy court and district court erred in
allowing the debtor-in-possession to assume the patent licenses in question); Institut
Pasteur, 104 F.3d at 495 (affirming the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of a Chapter 11
reorganization plan which allowed the debtor-in-possession to assume the patent licenses in question).
342
Nelson v. George Wong Pension Trust (In re Nelson) 391 B.R. 437, 452 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2008).
343
See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (“If Congress enacted into law
something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent.”); Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.,
530 U.S. 1, 13-14 (2000) (“Achieving a better policy outcome . . . is a task for Congress,
not the courts.”).
344
See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 542 n.3 (1996) (“[I]t is up to Congress, not this Court, to revise the [policy] if it so chooses.”); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502
U.S. 151, 162 (1991) (“Whether Congress has wisely balanced . . . sometimes conflicting policies . . . is not a question that we are authorized to decide.”).
345
See In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 754 (holding that the actual test “effectively engrafts a narrow exception onto § 365(c)(1)” and pointing out that it “reads the word
‘assume’ out of subsection (c) with respect to debtors in possession” (citing In re Fastrax, Inc., 129 B.R. 274, 277 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991))).
346
Id.
347
Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 308 (4th Cir. 2000).
348
Id.
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fully aligned with the goals of Chapter 11, a court cannot depart from
the plain, unambiguous language of the statute simply because it disagrees with the policy effects of such an interpretation.
V. THE LITERAL READING AS A CREDITOR-PROTECTION MEASURE
Though advocates of the actual test argue that the literal reading
undermines the goals of bankruptcy, the statute’s effect on the competing interest in federal patent law is equally important. The American bankruptcy system operates in a specialized court, with its own set
349
of rules set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. Because the umbrella of
the Bankruptcy Code creates a unique relationship between debtors
and creditors, the Code must focus on balancing the debtor’s and cred350
The literal reading of section 365(c)(1)(A) ensures
itor’s interests.
that the federal patent interest of nonassignability is not rendered inoperative by the competing free-assignability principle of bankruptcy
351
In fact, the limitation set forth in section 365(c) is a creditor’s
law.
only protection against the powerful free-transferability principle of section 365(f), which seeks to maximize the debtor’s estate and facilitate
352
reorganization.
Without section 365(c), a patent owner would have no protection
against an infringer who obtained a patent license from a bankrupt
debtor-licensee. Once the infringer has acquired a license for the patented invention, the nondebtor patent owner no longer has the pow353
er to sue for infringement. Losing control over which entities it can
sue effectively eliminates a patentee’s right to exclude.
Within the context of section 365(c), the federal common law principle of nontransferability can be viewed as a creditor-protection measure. From an equitable perspective, a creditor patent owner should not
be divested of its exclusive monopoly simply because its licensee,

349

These rules are codified in Title 11 of the United States Code. Congress passed
the Bankruptcy Code under its Constitutional grant of authority to “establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
350
For further discussion of these interests, see supra Section I.B.
351
For a discussion of the factors that led to the inclusion of the patent clause in
the U.S. Constitution, see Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing
Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 223, 299-304 (2006), available at
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol2/iss2/art4.
352
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c), (f) (2006).
353
See supra Section II.B (explaining that a patent license is merely a promise not
to sue for infringement).
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354

through no fault of the creditor patent owner, falls into bankruptcy.
Furthermore, a creditor patent owner has economic incentives for
wanting its patented technology to be readily available to consumers via
355
If the debtor-licensee can no longer meet this
the debtor-licensee.
obligation, then the creditor patent owner should be free to reject the
license and grant a new license to another entity that is better posi356
Further, this exertioned to bring the end product to the market.
cise of control is consistent with Congress’s treatment of patent policy
and its intent to encourage innovation in exchange for the right to
exclude, a proposition that forms the backbone of the American pa357
Under no circumstances should the creditor patent
tent system.
owner be compelled to allow a third party to use its license. Such
compulsion would threaten to undermine the foundation of the en358
tire patent system.
A. Patents Are a Property Right
It has been settled for more than a century that the rights secured
by a patent are property, and that patent property rights are no differ359
ent in the eyes of the Constitution than any other property right. As
the Supreme Court held in Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, “[a] patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The
354

See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (“In equity, as at law, when
the transfer amounts to a license only, the title remains in the owner of the patent . . . .”).
355
For example, the creditor patent holder may wish to receive royalties or trade
secrets based upon research, sale, or development of the patented invention.
356
Some critics argue that the literal reading of section 365(c) would provide a
windfall for the nondebtor: if the debtor is outside of bankruptcy, then the nondebtor
does not have the option to reject the license; if, however, the debtor files for bankruptcy, then the nondebtor can reclaim the license and potentially resell it at a higher
market rate. See N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578
(2009) (denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.) (discussing this
possible windfall, along with competing concerns about the actual test, but concluding
that this “is not the most suitable case for [the Court’s] resolution of the conflict”).
357
See supra Part II.
358
For example, in Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., the circuit court allowed the sale of the debtor’s stock to a competitor of the creditor but refused to allow
the creditor-licensor to reject the patent license. 104 F.3d 489, 493-94 (1st Cir. 1997).
Effectively, this enabled the competitor to gain use of the licensor’s patented technology when the creditor would never have offered such a license in the first instance. See
id. at 493 (noting plaintiff’s argument that “in substance” this was a cross-license to a
“complete stranger”).
359
Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 121 (1877) (“Rights secured to an inventor
by letters-patent are property . . . .”); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d
1456, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The law of patent ownership
has its roots in the common law of property . . . .”).

YING_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1278

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

3/17/2010 10:18 AM

[Vol. 158: 1225

right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by
360
the same sanctions.” For example, patent infringement constitutes a
361
“taking” of patent property similar to a “taking” of real property.
A strong analogy can be drawn between a patent license, granting
a right to invade the exclusive possession of patent property, and an
easement over a piece of real property, granting the right to commit
362
trespass.
Since the essence of trespass is the invasion of a person’s
363
interest in the exclusive possession of land, the landowner may not
bring an action for trespass against the person who has acquired an
364
easement over the land in question. Similarly, a patent licensee can
be viewed as one with an easement over the patent owner’s patent
rights. In granting the licensee the “easement,” the patent owner forgoes the right to sue the licensee for patent infringement.
The holder of an easement, however, can commit an actionable
365
trespass by exceeding its rights under the easement. For example, if
the easement holder misuses or deviates from the easement, this can
366
constitute unauthorized use. Likewise, if the easement is limited in
scope or purpose, the easement holder can become a trespasser by

360

94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876).
See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915) (stating that “the exclusive right conferred by the patent [is] property and the infringement [is] a tortious taking of a part of that property”).
362
“A ‘trespass’ occurs when there is an actionable interference with possession of
land.” Phillips v. Rathbone, 93 P.3d 835, 839 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Smejkal v.
Empire Lite-Rock, Inc., 547 P.2d 1363 (Or. 1976)).
363
See, e.g., Poff v. Hayes, 763 So. 2d 234, 240 (Ala. 2000) (clarifying that trespass
“is a wrong against the right of possession” (quoting Jefferies v. Bush, 608 So. 2d 361,
362 (Ala. 1992))); Munsey v. Hanly, 67 A. 217, 217 (Me. 1907) (“The gist of the action
of trespass . . . is the disturbance of the possession.”); Lane v. Mims, 70 S.E.2d 244, 246
(S.C. 1952) (noting that “the action of trespass . . . is founded upon possession”); Austin v. Hallstrom, 86 A.2d 549, 549 (Vt. 1952) (“The gist of the action of trespass upon
the freehold is the injury to the possession.”).
364
See, e.g., Simcox v. Hunt, 874 So. 2d 1010, 1018-19 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that easements confer a right of use and trespass requires entrance without a right).
365
See, e.g., Tice v. Herring, 717 So. 2d 181, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that the “burden of [an] easement . . . may not ordinarily extend beyond that which
was reasonably contemplated with the creation of the easement”); Schadewald v. Brulé,
570 N.W.2d 788, 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that a party cannot unilaterally increase the burden of an easement); Reinbott v. Tidwell, 191 S.W.3d 102, 109 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006) (explaining that if an easement holder exceeds his right of use “he is guilty
of trespass” (quoting Smith v. Woodard, 15 S.W.3d 768, 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000))).
366
See, e.g., Apel v. Katz, 697 N.E.2d 600, 607 (Ohio 1998) (affirming a jury verdict
that a person who had a roadway easement across adjacent property, but had used a
portion of the property outside the easement, had trespassed).
361
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367

exceeding the bounds of the easement. Most important to the issue
at hand, real property also recognizes that the existence of an ease368
ment does not justify an entry by a trespassing third party.
Similar to an easement in real property, a patent license limits the
scope and use of the licensee, and any deviation from the license con369
stitutes an act of infringement. Additionally, as with an easement, a
patent owner is protected from unauthorized infringement by “a trespassing third party” through injunctive relief.
B. Patent Law’s Injunctive Relief Against Infringers
The patent system’s reward of injunctive relief against patent infringers further justifies allowing a creditor patent owner to compel
the rejection of a license. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
370
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., a patent owner was automatically
granted an injunction preventing the infringer from continuing to
make, use, or sell the patented technology upon a finding of in371
fringement. Even after eBay, although a permanent injunction does
not automatically follow from a finding of infringement, a patent
owner can still obtain a permanent injunction if it satisfies the four372
factor test historically employed by courts of equity. Thus, the creditor patent owner’s right to prohibit assumption or assignment of the
license is similar to a patent owner’s right to obtain an injunction
against infringers. Both remedies operate as an equitable form of

367

See, e.g., Conner v. Lucas, 920 P.2d 171, 175 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that
planting trees on a roadway easement was a trespass because this use was inconsistent
with the use of the property as a roadway).
368
See, e.g., Tusa v. Cablevision, 691 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (App. Div. 1999) (holding
that where a utility easement was for the benefit of homeowners in a subdivision, the
installation of a line for the benefit of an owner outside the subdivision was a trespass).
369
Cf. Conner, 920 P.2d at 175 (finding the defendant liable for misuse of an easement).
370
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
371
See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(noting the “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent
infringement absent exceptional circumstances”), vacated, 547 U.S. 388.
372
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (detailing the four-factor test). A recent study published in IPToday.com found that, post-eBay, district courts were still granting injunctive relief over seventy percent of the time. See Ernest Grumbles, III, Rachel C. Hughey
& Susan Perera, The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis
of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Nov. 2009, available at http://www.
iptoday.com/issues/2009/11/articles/three-year-anniversary-eBay-MercExchange.asp
(finding that out of 67 district court injunction decisions, 48 (72%) granted relief
while 19 (28%) denied relief).
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protecting the fundamental right to exclude, which is embodied in
the federal common law principle of patent nontransferability.
The development of patent law has a historical foundation in real
property. Further, the Constitution recognizes the importance of
strong patent protection in order to foster innovation and develop373
ment for the public. In a bankruptcy proceeding, however, this federal patent interest is weighed against the competing interests of general bankruptcy policies. Although those who criticize a literal reading
of section 365(c) argue that such a reading undermines the general
goals of bankruptcy, they overlook the importance of balancing the
other federal interests at stake—namely, those of patent law. Thus,
while a literal reading of the statute may not protect the debtor to the
fullest extent possible, it best protects the creditor patent owner.
CONCLUSION
There is an inherent tension between the federal common law
principle of patent nontransferability and the free-transferability principle codified in section 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Because the
federal principle of patent nonassignability protects the nondebtor licensor from having to accept performance from, or render performance to, an entity other than that with which it originally contracted,
it falls under the “applicable law” exception of section 365(c). Courts
have struggled to reconcile these two competing interests. Courts have
developed two main tests in applying these provisions: the hypothetical test, which takes a literal reading of the statute, and the actual test,
which overrides the literal reading of the statute in favor of the general
goals of bankruptcy policy. Some members of the Supreme Court have
374
recognized the need to reconcile these two competing approaches.
To date, however, the Court has not found a suitable case for address375
ing this question, leaving the issue to the lower courts for now.

373

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra Part II.
See N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009)
(denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.).
375
Justice Kennedy recognized the importance of finding a suitable case:
374

The division in the courts over the meaning of [section] 365(c)(1) is an important one to resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that seek reorganization. This petition for certiorari, however, is not the most suitable
case for our resolution of the conflict. . . . In a different case the Court should
consider granting certiorari on this significant question.
Id. at 1578.

YING_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

The Plain Meaning of Section 365(c)

3/17/2010 10:18 AM

1281

After In re Footstar, some courts have departed from the two traditional tests. These courts have instead taken a third view, opting to apply neither the hypothetical test nor the actual test but ultimately reaching the same outcome that would result under the actual test. Despite
this, some commentators believe that In re Footstar and its progeny offer
376
a middle ground between the hypothetical and actual tests.
The courts that have adopted the actual test overlook the importance of the nondebtor’s patent rights—rights that should be placed
at the forefront as a protective measure against the debtor-friendly
broad power of free transferability. In considering the justifications
for adopting a particular interpretation of the statute, these courts
should consider, in addition to the general goals of bankruptcy, the
competing interests of federal patent law.
An examination of the plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the hypothetical test is the correct approach, even if it is not
as favorable to the debtor-licensee. Furthermore, the legislative history of the statute does not justify departing from the plain-meaning interpretation of the statute. Finally, the hypothetical test better protects the patent interest of the nondebtor licensor by prohibiting
assumption or assignment of the patent license.

376

See, e.g., Kuney, supra note 17, at 154 (“It may . . . strike the correct balance between the needs of owners and licensees.”).

